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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is an investigation of Amazonian Kichwa organizations from San Martín. I 
assess the challenges they are facing as they attempt to work together for the Peruvian 
government’s recognition of their territorial rights. Kichwa organizations’ efforts to secure their 
territorial rights constitute the bedrock of their efforts for constructing a common political 
platform in terms of their linguistic family as Kichwas. For Kichwas it is impossible to separate 
political rights from territorial rights. I explore the political dynamics of the Kichwa 
organizations known as federations, each of them politically representing several native 
communities. In having multiple federations lies the core of the challenges faced by this 
indigenous group: the more federations there are, the more the ethno-political engagement by the 
Kichwas but the more fragmented they become. Each one of these federations develops different 
strategies to deal with regional authorities, municipal mayors, non-governmental organizations, 
and national political parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Amazon accounts for 60% of Peru (see map below), and according to the 2007 
Peruvian Census, the Kichwa population is the third largest ethno-linguistic family of the thirteen 
that exist in the Peruvian Amazon.1 In the four San Martín provinces of Huallaga, El Dorado, 
San Martín, and Lamas (see Annex #1) alone there are around 30,000 Kichwa peoples.2 Ninety 
percent of the Kichwas there are peasants producing coffee, cocoa, beans, manioc and plantains 
in small plots called chacras. Their second most important economic activity is hunting (INEI 
2011:122). Control of their territory not only structures the Kichwas’ lifestyle but also defines 
their current struggles for political recognition. 
                                                
1 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - INEI. (2011). Censo 2007: Características sociodemográficas de 
2 The Kichwas would disagree with this number; they believe there are almost 50,000 Kichwas in San Martín. 
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Map of San Martín and Its Three Indigenous Territories 
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This thesis is an investigation of Upper Amazonian Kichwa organizations, or 
“federations,” of the San Martín region.  I assess the challenges they are facing as they attempt to 
work together for the Peruvian government’s recognition of their territorial rights. Kichwa 
organizations’ efforts to secure their territorial rights constitute the bedrock of their efforts for 
constructing a common political platform in terms of their linguistic family as Kichwas. For 
Kichwas it is impossible to separate political rights from territorial rights. There are four Kichwa 
federations, representing 50 of the 260 Kichwa communities in San Martín (Calderón, 2003; see 
Annex #2).3 Of those 50, only 15 have gained legal recognition of their territories. In having 
multiple federations lies the core of the challenges faced by this indigenous group: the more 
federations, the more the ethno-political engagement by the Kichwas, but also the more 
fragmented they become (see Annex #3). Each of these federations develops different strategies 
to deal with regional authorities, municipal mayors, non-governmental organizations, and 
national political parties. 
The first chapter introduces the main characters of this thesis and my methodology for 
understanding the challenges of the Kichwa organizations in their struggle for land. NGOs have 
been crucial partners of the Kichwa federations, and recently government representatives have 
created agencies for indigenous issues. Representatives from both were invaluable in guiding me 
through the labyrinth of Kichwa political organization. The second chapter is a summary of the 
literature about alliances between conservationist NGOs and Amazonian organizations. These 
alliances have shaped the Amazonians’ politics because until today thanks to these global links 
with NGOs and experiences, Amazonians have new opportunities for funding their activities in 
order to launch their own political agendas. In chapter three I show how in the history of Peru, 
                                                
3 Although there is not an official record reporting the number of Kichwa communities, in my last visit the head of 
the Regional Office of Indigenous Affairs of San Martín told me this information (Interviewee #25, January14, 
2012).  
 4 
Amazonians have been systematically neglected in order to promote large-scale extractive 
activities. Several changes in Peruvian law frame the Kichwas’ quest for their land rights. 
Finally, in chapter four I explain twelve challenges that limit the political representation of the 
Kichwas, weaken their local organizations, and create internal fragmentation.  
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CHAPTER I: METHODOLOGY 
 
Because I have Kichwa language training from the University of Kansas, I chose to focus 
my research on Kichwa organizations in the Amazon. The first time I went to Tarapoto city, the 
capital of San Martín region, was in June 2011. My initial plan was to stay for four weeks, but 
due to injuries I received walking in the jungle, I only stayed for one week. After two weeks of 
recovering in Lima I went back to Tarapoto and stayed for two more weeks. In January 2012 I 
returned for two weeks. This time I notably expanded the scope of my research conducting 
interviews and doing participant observation in the districts of San Jose de Sisa, Lamas, and 
Chazuta. The third and final trip in July 2012 proved to be the most productive because I was 
afforded admission to private meetings due to the relationships I had established in my previous 
visits. I conducted sixteen more interviews and focused on participant observation in several 
meetings and special gatherings to which I was invited. Overall, I conducted 46 in-depth 
interviews (see Annex #4) during June-July 2011, January 2012, and July-August 2012. Besides 
the names of my first contacts, the names of people interviewed during research have been 
omitted to protect their privacy. 
Because Kichwas have just started their own process of organization, it was a propitious 
moment to conduct these interviews. Kichwa leaders and their constituencies are working hard to 
consolidate their organizations. Therefore, they were interested in someone like me who could be 
able to register their experiences. Probably if I would have arrived earlier, when they were not 
working together, they might not have been interested in sharing their experiences. In turn I 
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promised to translate this thesis in Spanish, so they can have a written account of the challenges 
that they are facing in their struggle for their territorial rights.  
 
FIRST FIELDWORK, JUNE 2011 
 
When I first arrived in Tarapoto in 2011, I only had a general idea of the importance of 
the Amazonian indigenous organizations. It was my first time working in the upper Amazon of 
Peru, and I already knew that in 2009 San Martín’s indigenous organizations participated in a 
general Peruvian Amazonian indigenous protest against government refusal to consult them in 
decisions related to their territory.4 I designed an open-ended questionnaire that included 
questions such as: Why did the indigenous organizations from San Martín get involved in this 
national protest?  How did they organize for the protest?  Does the protest represent a turning 
point for the indigenous organizations in San Martín?  If so, how? 
The only contact I had was the director of an NGO called The Amazonian Center of 
Anthropology (CAAAP),5 but finding him absent, I was lucky that Lincoln Rojas, a retired 
schoolteacher, offered to help me. The oldest employee in CAAAP, Lincoln had a long 
experience working with indigenous organizations in San Martín.  He was also patient. He 
explained that in San Martín there are three indigenous ethnicities, the Kichwas, the Shawis, and 
the Awajun, who speak different languages and live in separate territories.  
Three main Kichwa federations – the Federation of Kichwa Indigenous Peoples from the 
San Martín region (FEPIKRESAM), the Ethnic Kichwa Council of the Amazon (CEPKA), and 
the Kichwa Huallaga and Dorado Federation (FEKHID) – represent several different indigenous 
                                                
4 In Chapter 4 I will explain in detail the Bagua Protest (June 2009). 
5 CAAAP: Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica. 
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communities (see Annex # 06). Each federation works with a particular NGO: FEPIKRESAM 
with CAAAP, CEPKA with Waman Wasi, and FEKHID with Urku. The work that each NGO 
does with its associated federation varies from providing legal advice to organizing workshops 
about leadership and farming practices. CAAAP has provided legal advice to indigenous 
organizations in San Martín since 1985; Waman Wasi (“house of the condor” in Kichwa) has 
over the last ten years supported Kichwa organizations in cultural affirmation with emphasis on 
territorial rights and ancestral practices; and Urku (“mountain” in Kichwa) promotes research in 
agriculture and environmental conservation among Kichwa organizations. The people in charge 
of these organizations are engineers with experience working in San Martín first as independent 
consultants and then designing projects for these NGOs. As I will show in chapter three and four, 
Kichwas in San Martin have not had attention from the government, therefore external support 
from NGOs have been the only ones interested in support projects focused on indigenous 
peoples. 
Lincoln Rojas also introduced me to Robinson Shupingahua, a Kichwa leader with 
CAAAP who organizes workshops. I interviewed Mr. Shupingahua, and he invited me to go with 
him and William Guerra, a Kichwa leader, to an indigenous community called Yurilamas. He 
told me it was the first time in four years that the leaders of this community had invited CAAAP, 
and it was a good opportunity for me to see a real Kichwa community.  
Our journey to Yurilamas started with an eight-hour walk through the mountainous jungle 
in the rain. It was grueling, and I doubted I could make it. When I finally did, the leaders were 
surprised to see me. Due to the remoteness – it is the farthest Kichwa community in San Martín–
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visitors rarely arrive. I participated in the workshop, conducted two interviews, and spent a lot of 
time with the family of the Apu of Yurilamas, who hosted me for two days.6 
Because of that experience I became “less strange” and perhaps more trustworthy to the 
indigenous leaders of this area. I was lucky because later I discovered Robinson and William are 
very important indigenous leaders from FEPIKRESAM. William is the Vice-President, and 
Robinson participated in the massive indigenous protest of 2009. Since that trip, William and 
Robinson have always helped me contact people for interviews.  
Before returning to Lima, I attended a small protest by indigenous leaders from 
FEPIKRESAM in front of the Law Court of Tarapoto city. They were all waiting to see how the 
judge was going to rule regarding three people who lead the 2009 protest. Robinson was one of 
the accused. The protest was an opportunity to observe the level of organization they had, and 
also to interview the oldest leaders from FEPIKRESAM about their reactions to that protest and 
events surrounding it.  
Two weeks later, I interviewed Kichwa leaders from the other two federations, CEPKA 
and FEKHID. I asked them about their experience as leaders, the challenges they had faced in 
the past with their organizations, the challenges they confront now, and what projects the 
organization has for the future. Daniel Vecco, the director of Urku, the NGO that supports 
FEKHID, invited me to a meeting in the Kichwa community of Kawana Sisa. Kawana Sisa is 
located in the district of San Jose de Sisa, a three-hour drive by motorcycle from Tarapoto. In 
Kawana Sisa I attended a communal assembly, a formal meeting where the entire community 
unites once every three months to discuss issues related to community’s organization. I 
witnessed how their community organization is not only important for political representation at 
the local and national level, but also for every communal endeavor, such as the construction of 
                                                
6 The Apu is the title given by the community to the political and spiritual leader. 
 9 
the road, encouraging families to speak in Kichwa with their children, and attending workshops 
organized by NGOs or government agencies. In San Jose de Sisa I conducted an interview with 
the President of the new federation, FEKHID, and with two other apus of the communities that 
are part of FEKHID.  
William Guerra, the Vice-President of FEPIKRESAM, put me in contact with the 
president and other leaders of CEPKA in the small town of Lamas. Those leaders, in turn, put me 
in contact with the director of Waman Wasi, the NGO that supports them.  
Finally, I visited the very large and significant district of Chazuta, which is a five hour-
drive by car from Tarapoto. I went with Cesar, who does not work with indigenous organizations 
but is a friend who used to teach in a public school in Chazuta. In the communities of 
Tuluntulumba and Santa Rosa de Picota, I interviewed the apus who belonged to CEPKA and 
FEPIKRESAM, respectively. 
 
SECOND FIELDWORK, JANUARY 2012 
 
Six months later I returned to Tarapoto for two weeks. Having already collected the 
indigenous leaders’ opinions, as well as those of their partner NGOs, I focused on the 
government’s policies and actions concerning the indigenous peoples from the San Martín region 
to understand the challenges faced by the Amazonian Kichwa organizations in gaining official 
territorial recognition. To garner the perspective of the Peruvian central government in the 
region, I spoke with the Governor of San Jose de Sisa, the Lieutenant Governor of San Jose de 
Sisa, the Alderman of Lamas, the head of the Office of Indigenous Affairs of Lamas, and the 
head of the Regional Office of Indigenous Affairs of San Martín. It would have been impossible 
to contact them without the help of the NGO Urku, and Robinson, the Kichwa leader formerly 
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with CAAAP but who had just started working in the Office of Indigenous Affairs of Lamas. By 
talking to governmental representatives I discovered that a new federation, Kichwa Federation 
from Chazuta (FEPIKECHA), had formed, and this became a major topic of our conversations. 
We also discussed what the officials thought about the current Peruvian government, especially 
in regards to indigenous peoples. 
 
THIRD FIELDWORK, JULY-AUGUST 2012 
 
 In July of 2012 I went back to Tarapoto for four weeks to investigate FEPIKECHA, the 
newest Kichwa federation, particularly, what motivated its members to splinter from previously 
established ones and form their own. I also elicited the perceptions of the leaders from the other 
federations about this new federation. For nearly two weeks I also visited the staff in the 
Regional Government in Moyobamba city, the second more important city in San Martín after 
Tarapoto. In Moyobamba the government representatives revealed an ongoing relationship 
between the regional government and some environmentalist NGOs, which prompted me to 
procure interviews with the directors of these as well. The environmental NGOs have been 
supporting the regional government’s projects focused on environmental protection, and their 
leaders had much to say about the various indigenous organizations.  
 After Moyobamba, I went to Chazuta to investigate directly FEPIKECHA. Victor 
Cachique, the head of the governmental Regional Office of Indigenous Affairs of San Martín, 
ORDEPISAM, accompanied me.7 I had met Victor from my second visit, when he was 
discouraged about ORDEPISAM. Six months later, however, he was optimistic because his 
office received more funds to organize different activities such as workshops with the indigenous 
                                                
7 Oficina Regional de Pueblos Indígenas de San Martín. 
 11 
leaders from the different federations. Luckily for me, his next such workshop was in Chazuta 
with FEPIKECHA. In that workshop I met Aquilino Chuangama, the president of FEPIKECHA, 
who explained the federation’s origin and the NGOs from which he was soliciting funding, 
including some of which I had never heard, including the Institute for the Development of 
Amazonian Peace (IDPA), and Peace and Hope.8 IDPA had recently been organizing meetings 
uniting the leaders of the four federations.  
 I devoted most of my remaining time in Tarapoto conducting interviews with the 
representatives of these NGOs. In addition, I also participated in a meeting where Kichwa 
leaders got together. The more time I spent among the various organizations, the more welcome I 
was at the meetings, and the leaders even made sure to invite me to all the meetings. I had the 
chance to listen NGO representatives, regional government representatives, and some apus.  
                                                
8 Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Paz Amazónica (IDPA), and Paz y Esperanza. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature focused on the different ways 
Amazonian indigenous organizations have articulated their struggles. The implementation of 
neoliberal policies has led the government to hinder the struggle of indigenous groups for the 
recognition of their land rights. After reviewing how neoliberal policies have shaped the 
Amazonians’ visibility at the local and international level, I assess the ways that Amazonian 
organizations are attempting to establish local political platforms in order to protect their natural 
resources. To this end, international conservationist organizations and Amazonian organizations 
have formed a transnational alliance so that Amazonians’ can be heard globally. However, as we 
will see in this chapter, wedding the Amazonians’ political discourses with that of environmental 
conservation is problematic. Literature suggests that some indigenous groups have surrendered 
control over their own agendas to have a fruitful relationship with global conservationists.  
 
NEOLIBERALISM, LAND RIGHTS & DOUBLE DISCOURSES 
 
Neoliberalism proposes the reorganization of society around market principles. 
According to this doctrine, nearly all the resources of a nation should be managed and owned 
individually or privately (Harvey 2005). This political doctrine dresses itself as a development 
program (McMichael 2008 and 2010). According to the promoters of neoliberalism, the absolute 
privatization of a nation’s resources is the most efficient way to generate social welfare. 
Neoliberal policies have often undermined indigenous movements’ struggle for territorial 
and cultural rights. Under these policies, states have persistently marginalized minorities, who 
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have been portrayed as an impediment to foreign direct investments or to national private capital. 
Neoliberal policies coupled with paternalistic views of indigenous peoples have resulted in 
turning “indigenous people into culturally homogenized citizens of the nation, based in 
assumptions about their backwardness and incapacity to survive modernity’s onslaught” 
(Conklin 2006:162). The literature also considers how indigenous peoples have shaped their 
responses to unfavorable economic conditions by creating a political platform. It is precisely in 
this climate that indigenous movements have obtained legitimacy to operate in a process of 
“creative and constructive alignments” (Sawyer 2004). One example of these alignments can be 
observed in the alliances between indigenous movements and international NGOs. In this socio-
economic context, indigenous peoples’ responses to neoliberal attacks depend on the different 
ways the state has promoted neoliberal practices such as the leasing of the Amazonian territory 
to private companies (Speed 2005).  
The analysis of neoliberalism in Latin America requires us to consider the limited 
recognition of cultural rights. Today in Latin America neoliberal governance implies launching 
the principle of intercultural equality or multiculturalism as a new strategy of governance. This 
emphasis on intercultural equality “brings forth a new direction in social policy, emphasizing the 
development of civil society and social capital, and an approach to cultural rights that at first 
glance appears highly counterintuitive” (Hale 2005:12). This political strategy can be found in 
the state’s efforts of recognizing – to a certain degree – indigenous’ collective rights. To this end, 
some governments have merged neoliberal principles with concepts of multiculturalism and 
human rights (Speed 2005). The state’s deployment of multiple discourses of privatization on the 
one hand, and indigenous group rights on the other, is contradictory. According to the literature, 
it is more likely for a neoliberal government to promote “cultural” rights without granting 
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“territorial” rights to indigenous groups. Consequently, multiculturalism serves to limit 
indigenous’ resistance by creating the illusion that they have already achieved their goals. These 
neoliberal discourses make it appear as if states are receptive to indigenous territorial and 
political demands, whereas in practice states never intended to respect such demands. As I will 
show in chapter three and four, one example of the measures taken by the state on behalf of 
indigenous peoples has been the opening of offices for indigenous affairs in the regional 
governments. 
The state’s two-faced neoliberal policies towards indigenous peoples have thus resulted 
in both a political opening and a threat of co-optation. On one hand, these policies have allowed 
indigenous peoples to access governmental offices to channel their demands. On the other hand, 
as long as “the state as political form constitutes the greater part of the institutionality 
constructed by dominant sectors to protect their own interests,” indigenous capability to take 
advantage of governmental offices will be limited (Almeida 2005:94). Discourses of inclusion 
such as multiculturalism have been manipulated by the state in order to maintain, validate, but 
ultimately obfuscate its true neoliberal policies. If the state keeps preventing indigenous groups 
from decision-making regarding the distribution of economic resources and political rights, these 
discourses would continue to be just public displays without addressing the real issues of 
indigenous groups (Almeida 2005).  
The state’s multicultural discourses are thus duplicitous, and its policies confront 
indigenous people with a dilemma. If they choose not to participate in the limited opportunities 
offered by the state then they are stigmatized as problematic or radicals. If they do participate, 
they are subject to manipulation, co-option, and false promises.9 
                                                
9 As Bagua protest has shown, this dilemma does not exclude direct actions like road blockages or marches of 
protest when necessary. 
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NGOs AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
  
Understanding the possibilities of indigenous organizations for advancing their political 
agendas requires a close look at the relationship between international conservationist NGOs and 
indigenous peoples. Many scholars have discussed the necessity of linking indigenous 
movements with their peers and allies at the global level. “The internationalization of Indian 
rights occurred precisely because indigenous social movements were weak domestically; some 
of their domestic weaknesses actually facilitated transnational alliance building and 
effectiveness” (Brysk 1996:39). We cannot understand indigenous groups’ connections at the 
global level without considering how these groups cope with different domestic opportunities 
and threats. And vice versa, the analysis of domestic opportunities allows us to understand how 
global alliances are constructed. 
According to the literature, to protect their natural resources, local indigenous groups 
needed to gain conservationist international organizations’ attention. These indigenous groups, 
instead of thinking that eventually the national government will consider their demands, found a 
better reception among international conservationist organizations interested in hearing their 
experiences. Therefore, as the logical step in their national social activism campaigns to thwart 
invasions to their lands –particularly in the Amazon– movements have leap-frogged aggressive 
or unresponsive states with an international approach of allying with global environmental 
organizations (Hall et al. 2011; Martínez-Alier 2005; Peña 1998; Sawyer 2004; Rootes 2007). 
These alliances are “characterized by an enormous enthusiasm and a sense of empowerment, 
along with a good deal of romanticism and sometimes simplistic assumptions that native control 
of territory and resources would guarantee environmental preservation” (Conklin 2006:168). 
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This literature suggests that these alliances have been important during the early stages of the 
organization of Amazonian groups. 
The connections between local indigenous organizations and international 
environmentalist organizations serve the politics of both groups. Conklin and Graham (1995), 
Keck (1995), and Pieck (2006) have argued that the accomplishments reached by indigenous 
organizations have been a consequence of their connections with international social actors. 
Today it would not be possible to understand the international dimension of indigenous politics 
without tracing the relationship back thirty years ago (Pieck 2006). The motto “think locally, act 
globally” mobilized transnational resources and conservationist ideas to support indigenous 
groups (Conklin 2006). This trend has triggered a huge change in the way that indigenous groups 
were used to operating. The marginalization caused by their cultural and ethnic values and 
national exclusion was partially overcome, and being backwards “Indians” was finally reversed 
as positive “indigenous,” at least for some people. Consequently, indigenous groups had 
attention long-awaited opportunity to make their demands heard in the global arena. 
Latin American countries’ democratization processes also played an important role in 
enabling indigenous organizations to claim ethnically-based rights. At the end of the 1980s, 
when the Cold War and many of Latin American civil wars were winding down, Latin American 
countries underwent fundamental political, economic and cultural changes. Most Latin American 
countries’ presidents were more amenable to human rights and the opening of civil society rather 
than rule by repression. Thanks to this democratic window, indigenous leaders faced less 
repression by the governments and gained more presence in the political realm (Pieck 2006). In 
this global scenario, which also coincided with much sympathetic attention to indigenous issues 
in the run-up to the Columbian Quincentenary, transnational links seem to have had a crucial role 
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“connecting indigenous causes with a much larger, well funded networks of international 
environmental NGOs and set indigenous claims apart from the claims of other impoverished 
people and ethnic groups with their own histories of oppression and suffering” (Conklin 
2006:163). However, at a national level, in the Amazon especially, knowledge about indigenous 
peoples and threats to their territories were still clouded by distance and inaccessibility. Still 
today there are many misconceptions about Amazonian “Indians.” According to institutions such 
as the World Bank, and some northern environmental NGOs, the “Indians” are the ones who 
need guidance to protect the environment (Escobar 1998). As a result, the open political climate 
at the global level has often disempowered Amazonians in their struggles with states.  
 Although transnational alliances meant new opportunities for indigenous groups because 
they gained access to the media, funding, and “green” discourses to articulate their demands, it 
also helped international environmentalist organizations. Because of indigenous peoples’ 
legitimacy and attraction of public sympathy, environmental organizations cashed in on the 
alliances. Previously, as Peña (1998), Conklin and Graham (1995), and Martínez-Alier (1995) 
describe, international environmentalists restricted their conservation projects to protecting 
endangered species, and they often blamed the poor for damaging ecosystems. Thereafter, the 
assumption that indigenous peoples were or could be potential environmental stewards became 
de rigueur. 
For indigenous groups, having international allies has both enhanced and complicated 
their pursuit of political goals. Tsutsui (2004), Pulido (1998), and Conklin and Graham (1995) 
examine these global linkages in two different ways. On one hand Tsutsui’s primary purpose is 
to point out how the expansion of human rights has enabled indigenous movements. Thanks to 
NGOs, local movements have been able to claim human rights on the global stage. Thus, 
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transnational alliances have the potential to empower indigenous groups, placing the 
governments under international scrutiny, and connecting minorities with similar groups all 
around the world. On the other hand, Conklin and Graham (1995) consider international NGOs 
as self-interested actors for their own ideological and political causes. To these authors, this 
transnational alliance has allowed environmentalists to gain more funding for their own causes 
regarding the protection of flora and fauna. Consequently, the existence of these transnational 
alliances has enabled Amazonian indigenous groups to bypass the state by gaining international 
visibility and support; however, these alliances have often resulted in international 
conservationist organizations using indigenous people for their own purposes. 
 
ESSENTIALISM 
 
The adoption of “transnational indigeneity discourses” (Ghosh 2006) can result in 
indigenous groups displaying an “essentialist” version of their “Indian-ness” as a strategy to gain 
ecological legitimacy (Peña 1998; Cepek 2008; Reed 2003; Lauer 2005). In other words, 
indigenous people can take advantage of the timeless, Garden-of-Eden “magic” or “mystique” of 
their cultural identities to be recognized as natural environmental stewards: “lacking material or 
organizational resources, South American Indians were able to develop and project this 
[indigenous] identity internationally through a politics of information” (Brysk 1996:48).  
Essentialism, as a strategy, involves risks. Environmental discourses based on an 
essentialist perspective of Indians as the main protectors of the Amazon downplay indigenous 
groups’ priorities and homogenize their diversity. Indigenous groups’ particularities in regard to 
biophysical location, gender, and ethnicity have often gone unrecognized, deleteriously affecting 
project results (Peña 1998; Ghosh 2006; Conklin 2006). Stereotyping of the “Ecological Indian” 
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also “denies or obfuscates the whole problem of social or historical agency, obscuring dominant 
power dynamics such as the struggles between rich and poor, landowners and tenants, thus 
reifying cultural differences” (Peña 1998:122). Such reification can occur both in the 
performance to outsiders and internally as embodied identity. 
Externally, outsiders such as governmental and non-governmental offices still have a hard 
time understanding indigenous groups who cannot meet this essentialist image. Today, one of the 
main challenges for indigenous groups and their leaders is to prove how “authentic” they are to 
get the attention and support from outsiders: “Native groups that did not fit the caricature of the 
noble savage found no place” (Reed 2003:113). To that end, indigenous peoples have gotten 
used to “‘borrowed’ forms of bodily adornment and even languages from other publicly 
recognized indigenous groups to authenticate their claims” (Graham 2005:625). For example, 
Peruvian national and local government have failed to recognize the existence of indigenous 
groups mainly because they are expecting to find an indigenous cultural display that may not be 
related to their cultural identity. Hence, in Peru, to become an indigenous community legally 
recognized by the state, indigenous peoples have to prove their level of indigeneity to 
government officials, who sometimes choose to accept this evidence, and sometimes do not 
(Killick 2008). Therefore, the essentialist perspective has served as a framework that further 
marginalizes the majority of indigenous groups that choose to be recognized as they are and 
refuse to disguise themselves as “authentic” or “wild” “Indians.” 
Internally, indigenous peoples have also questioned how “authentic” they should be, 
creating a crisis of representation among themselves. Transnational alliances have shaped 
indigenous peoples in so many ways, that it is more common for indigenous leaders to perform 
as “authentic” Indians, even among their peers: “today young Kichwa leaders wear crowns made 
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of feathers (imitating leaders from other ethnicities) that nobody has used before, the bigger the 
crown the more important they feel” (Interviewee #24, July 13, 2011). Young indigenous leaders 
believe that effective political representation relies on a proper performance of their indigeneity 
that would also bring the attention of external funding (Lucero 2006). Choosing an indigenous 
leader is becoming harder and harder because indigenous peoples need  “to designate [people] 
who are both representative of the group’s values and effective in the wider political arena” 
(Brysk 1996:51). The more prepared the leader is to represent an indigenous organization 
nationally and internationally, the less he is to connect internally with his domestic 
constituencies (Brysk 1996; Lucero 2006; Ghosh 2006; Graham 2005). As a result, young 
leaders who no longer engage with indigenous peoples’ struggles for territory feel more 
motivated to reinvent a public image of themselves as “Indians” to gain national and 
international attention. At the same time, while adopting Western images, they also adopt 
Western cultural habits, languages, and tastes. 
 In summary, the adoption of global environmental language initially functioned to 
empower in the international arena, but has led to other problems (Reed 2003; Hristov 2005; 
Ghosh 2006). Wide spread attention to indigenous groups’ authenticity has served to divert 
attention from territorial struggles. This indigenous essentialist strategy obscures and dilutes 
more urgent territorial and political threats.   
 
ALTERNATIVES 
 
The essentialist strategy has created the illusion that indigenous peoples’ ideals are the 
same ones pursued by Northern NGOs. Everybody is, supposedly, sharing the same 
conservationist principles formulated around the constructed model that Indians will never go 
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against “nature,” and therefore their perspectives are “just like the environmentally concerned 
outsiders” (Conklin and Graham 1995:695). Nevertheless, we should remember that essentialism 
is just one possible strategy. It can be taken or rejected in favor of other kinds of strategies. On 
the one hand, by presenting themselves as legitimate guarantors of nature, indigenous groups can 
obtain moral legitimacy to defend their natural resources (Arambiza 2006). On the other hand, 
indigenous peoples have the ability to establish ties with Northern NGOs without tailoring their 
discourses to global trends. 
I want to argue in this section that not all indigenous groups are tailoring their discourses 
and practices to global ideals. Conklin and Graham (1995) present the example of the Kayapó 
Native Amazonians, who have chosen to engage in activities that are opposed to environmental 
principles, such as allowing oil and timber exploitation. In order to avoid these possible 
contradictions, Northern NGOs have pressured indigenous peoples to maintain their “green” 
image of themselves. Indigenous peoples have not been immune to such pressure because of the 
critical importance of NGO support in their struggles with states (Conklin and Graham 1995). 
The use of the transnational indigeneity discourse has worked only at a certain point when 
indigenous groups started to launch their own political platforms. Today, essentialist 
representations have been criticized by other leaders seeking for a more honest representation of 
themselves. 
Conservationist groups have also faced the problem that some indigenous groups want to 
assert their own ideas of development, which sometimes are not consistent with the idealized 
conservation of their territory. Therefore, “environmentalists can no longer rely” exclusively on 
indigenous peoples’ environmentalist sentiments “to carry their agendas forward” (Pieck 
2006:323). Alternatives for indigenous organizations lie in their ability to determine their own 
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identity based on their own traditions, despite the outsiders’ basic assumptions about Indians. To 
that end, as I will explain in chapter three, indigenous leaders are seeking to be politically united 
first. The indigenous’ process of self-definition would have to embrace their knowledge and 
concerns about the environment without taking an essentialist position. Indigenous peoples do 
have ecological concerns that are “place-based sensitive to specific locales and the biological 
interrelations of plants, animals, air, water, and life-sustaining processes” (Conklin 2006:165). 
However, this awareness of local conditions does not necessarily suppose a breakup with global 
connections. On the contrary this can fit certain agendas of global NGOs (Reed 2003; Lauer 
2005).  
Today, indigenous peoples have more political experience and broader connections with 
international non-governmental organizations (Peña 1998; Vadjunec et al. 2011). Even though 
we cannot expect these alliances to be always successful, we can see these transnational linkages 
as opportunities for indigenous leaders to develop their political skills. The alliance with NGOs 
is just one possibility. Amazonian communities have found other pathways to territorial 
protection and development (Macdonald 2010). Indigenous organizations are not just limited to 
the defense of their territories or their lifestyle. They are also claiming to be recognized as part of 
civil society today using transnational alliances or direct actions like road blockages (Sawyer 
2004). Finally, according to this literature review, Amazonian indigenous groups can demand to 
be considered equals inside their own countries with or without the help of international partners, 
and with or without essentialist strategies.  
To sum up, theoretical debates around indigenous organization shave shown the different 
ways in which these Amazonians have launched their political representation. The literature 
illustrates how the relationship that Amazonians have with the state and NGOs has shaped their 
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struggle to protect their territory. On one side, lately neoliberal governance has included the 
recognition of intercultural equality and multiculturalism; however, indigenous peoples’ 
participation in political and economic decisions is limited. On the other side, alliances with 
NGOs have led to different strategies taken by indigenous groups seeking for their self-
recognition, and land enhanced their visibility and attracted sorely needed funds, but 
compromised their sovereignty and very identities. Today, thanks in part to both governmental 
and NGO interventions, Amazonians’ quest to gain formal recognition of their territories has 
resulted in the creation of their own political organizations. In the next chapter, using the 
Amazonian Kichwas as an example, I will discuss how these political organizations have been 
unable to overcome the Peruvian state’s inconsistency in recognizing the rights of Amazonian 
peoples. Despite the efforts of their leaders, Kichwa organizations have many challenges to 
working in a unified way.  
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CHAPTER III: POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter reviews the ways in which different governments have systematically 
violated indigenous rights in Peru despite multicultural discourse. The Bagua protest, in which 
indigenous activists were killed by Peruvian police while protesting against a set of neoliberal 
legal amendments proposed by the former president of Peru Alan García [2006-2011], is only the 
latest example. This protest, which went far beyond environmental NGO-prescribed activities, 
succeeded in gaining the attention of the media and the civil society for promoting the 
recognition of their territories. The participation in the Bagua protest helps to understand the 
Kichwas’ enthusiastic support of the candidacy of the current president Ollanta Humala [2011-
2016]. An analysis of his Consultation Law shows that the Amazonian indigenous’ condition of 
marginalization has not changed. This chapter aims to provide the political context for framing 
the challenges Kichwa communities are facing to obtain their land rights. The legal context 
described in this chapter allow us to understand how the Kichwa leaders are using federations as 
a strategy to deal with central government directives. 
 
THE PERUVIAN STATE AND THE AMAZON 
 
The historical relationship between the Peruvian state and the Amazonian indigenous 
people has been uneven and asymmetrical. It has been generally characterized by the state’s 
disregard of indigenous groups and their rights to territory. The Peruvian government’s position 
towards indigenous population contrasts with its attention to “non-Indians” in the Amazon. Thus, 
the struggle between the dominated indigenous population and the dominant “non-Indian” or 
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mestizo elites is ultimately rooted in a history of Spanish colonization (Chase Smith 1982), in 
which “modern” or “civilized” elites’ values have been imposed upon those of the indigenous 
minorities. The current difficulties the Kichwas face in obtaining land rights exemplifies the 
marginalization endured by the inhabitants of the Amazon. 
The idea that the Amazon is an empty space waiting for the colonization from outsiders 
has been the main rationale of the Peruvian state’s decisions. Because in the Amazon, indigenous 
groups’ perception of their territory does not involve the idea of legal property per se, mestizos 
have assumed that the land was free for the taking. Moreover, it is assumed that the Indians did 
not know how to use the land effectively, and therefore the outsiders had the right to colonize 
that land (Hristov 2005). With the exception of General Juan Velasco’s government (explained 
below), the Peruvian state has considered the Amazon to be unexploited hinterland compared to 
more nationalized coastal region and the Andes (Santos-Granero 2002). Thus, recognition of 
indigenous people and their rights depends on a wholesale transformation of state policy. 
Indigenous peoples have historically clashed with mestizos over land tenure. While the Amazon 
has largely been seen as impenetrable to colonizers, since the republican period of Peru the state 
has promoted the colonization of the Amazon by mestizos. “The Amazon was open to extractive 
and commercial economy” (Calderon 2003:33). Ideas about the existence of wild “Indians” in a 
wild territory justified the state’s invitation to mestizos to make a profitable use of the Amazon. 
During the nineteenth century Amazonians were confronted by colonizers, from the Pacific coast 
and the Andes, looking for “vacant lands” where they could settle in new farm lands and extract 
rubber or timber (Calderon 2003). Ever since, the confrontation between Amazonians and 
incoming mestizos has increased the pressure to formalize indigenous land tenure.  
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Various laws have been enacted promoting the colonization of the Amazon. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century the first law that addressed indigenous peoples’ territories was 
the Law of the Wilds.10 That law, enacted in 1909, attempted to distribute the Amazonian 
territory through a leasing system for the exploitation of natural resources and ignored the 
existence and the rights of the indigenous population.11 Due to the lack of laws for Amazonian 
indigenous people, Amazonians had to follow a law that promoted agricultural activities for 
Andean indigenous communities (Roldan and Tamayo 1999). The assumption that someday 
Amazonian communities will become sedentary monoculture producers following the 
“occidental” model of farming was based on the assumption that Amazonian “Indians” had the 
same characteristics as Andean “Indians” (Greene 2009).  
 
VELASCO 
 
The enactment of the Native Communities Law in 1974 during the military government 
of Juan Velasco Alvarado [1968-1975] finally recognized Amazonians’ right to territory. The 
Native Communities Law recognized the existence of Amazonian indigenous communities by 
granting them the capacity to exercise their rights and obligations (Roldan and Tamayo 1999). 
Thanks to this law, indigenous territory became inalienable, indefeasible, and imprescriptible.12 
This law gave indigenous leaders the authority and autonomy to solve small claims within the 
                                                
10 Ley # 1220, de Tierras de Montaña. 
11 An example of this logic can be seen in the book written by Fernando Belaúnde in 1959 called The Conquest of 
Peru by the Peruvians, in which Belaúnde describes how indigenous people are obstacles to development.  
12  In a Conference in Moyobamba (08-04-2012) Roger Rumrill and Stefano Varese remembered those 
characteristics as the three “I”s: Inalienable, Indefeasible, and Imprescriptible. 
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community, and exonerated their territory from taxation. More than 60 indigenous groups from 
the Amazon started the process of filing for territorial recognition.13 
With the creation of the Law of Native Communities, an office called SINAMOS 
constructed several channels of communication and agreements with the Amazonian indigenous 
peoples.14 One of the goals of this office was to amend crucial failures of the Peruvian state in 
the Amazon (Greene 2009). According to Greene (2009), before the law Amazonian people were 
considered just “savage Indians” or “chunchos.”15 After the law, the term “native community” 
was applied to Amazonian groups of the same ethnicity with a common territory, instead of the 
anthropological word “tribe.” For the Kichwa leaders, the Law of Native Communities is still 
today a key historical and legal referent for demanding their rights. 
The favorable climate for Amazonian indigenous peoples during Velasco’s government 
also resulted in the spontaneous creation of civil organizations interested in a pan-Amazonian 
political project. To that end, intellectual activists that had previous experience working in 
different parts of the Amazon with different ethnic groups united to launch a communication 
network to advocate for the Amazon with the help of international NGOs. Amazonian leaders 
that participated in these meetings questioned the role of the state, but also questioned the role of 
these enthusiast activists that made the meetings possible in the first place (Greene 2009). In this 
favorable political climate, a group of anthropologists founded the Center of Amazonian 
Research and Promotion (CIPA), a nonprofit organization, and a group of Amazonian leaders 
founded the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP). 
The work of both organizations called the attention of international NGOs that enabled the 
                                                
13 The economic and social reforms of Velasco’s government allowed also the promotion of bilingual education in 
Perú. For the first time the people who spoke other languages than Spanish were included in the education policies. 
14 SINAMOS from the two Spanish words: “sin amos,” which means “without masters.” 
15 “Chuncho” is a Kichwa word for savage Indian. 
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international exposure of indigenous issues. Although it has been impossible for AIDESEP to 
maintain financial independence from NGOs, until today it is the most well established 
indigenous organization in Peru. Hence, since the eighties AIDESEP has obtained a national and 
international recognition because it has succeeded in establishing alliances between local 
Amazonian indigenous organizations, such as the Kichwas, with international conservationist 
organizations.  
 
AMENDMENTS 
 
The amendments of the Law of Native Communities in the following governments have 
reversed the legal protections of Amazonian groups.16 President Morales Bermudez [1975-1980] 
revoked several of Velasco’s revolutionary policies17 before they could even be tailored to 
individual Amazonian groups.18 The 1978 amendments to the Law of Native Communities, 
known as legislative decree 22175 or the New Law of Native Communities, were designed to 
block Velasco’s efforts to integrate Amazonian peoples. The New Law made substantial changes 
particularly in regards to the land tenure system. According to these amendments, the lands 
occupied by indigenous peoples were simply being “used” by them, not legally “owned,” thus 
enabling private companies and settlers to access large spaces of the Amazon for extractive and 
agricultural activities (Roldan and Tamayo 1999; Greene 2009). Although indigenous 
organizations strongly protested these changes, the amendments still exist until today, 
reaffirming old prejudices towards the Amazon. 
                                                
16 The Law of Native Communities has been modified so many times that now there is nothing left. (Personal 
communication with Roger Rumrill, August 03, 2012). 
17 One example of Morales Bermudez rejection against Velasco’s policies was the political persecution to the people 
who had worked for Velasco’s government.  
18 Personal communication with Stefano Varese, August 02, 2012. 
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The following government’s denial to consider Amazonians as legitimate owners of their 
ancestral territories ushered in the old extractivist agenda. According to this political project, 
Peruvian development solely depends on the extraction of raw materials such as oil, lumber, or 
minerals. Due to the richness of the Amazon, subsequent governments wanted to control this vast 
territory without consulting indigenous peoples. Either through the enactment of laws, or by 
sending the army and facilitating mestizo colonization, subsequent Peruvian presidents treated 
the Amazon as an empty lot of rich natural resources (Abad 2006). 
 
TERROR IN THE AMAZON 
 
The armed actions of Shining Path during the governments of Belaúnde [1980-1985] and 
García [1985-1990] demonstrated the vulnerability of the Amazonian region. Shining Path 
started its operations in the Andean highlands where it effectively swept away state control by 
killing or forcing government actors such as governors, mayors, and judges to flee (Crabtree 
2005).19 Shining Path then used the difficult geography of the Amazon as a strategic place to set 
up their activities. According to Santos-Granero, Shining Path’s discourse proposing a radical 
political change attracted some segments of one of the largest Amazonian ethnicities – the 
Ashaninkas (Santos-Granero 2002). To Santos-Granero, Shining Path represented an alternative 
discourse, and at the beginning some Ashaninkas assisted Shining Path in navigating the forest. 
However, it needs to be noted that Shining Path forced enlistment of boys and murdered several 
Ashaninka leaders opposing Shining Path’s tactics, ultimately leading to a bloody confrontation. 
In 1990 more than 9000 Ashaninka people up rose against the Shining Path, pushing this armed 
                                                
19 It is very difficult to set a specific period of the Shining Path actions. The first public attack was in the Andean 
peasant community of Ayacucho in 1980. After more than ten years of actions, in 1992 the police finally captured 
Shining Path’s leader, Abimael Guzman, marking an abrupt decline of the movement. 
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group out of Ashaninka territory. However, most Amazonians fled their native lands as Shining 
Path moved in (Abad 2006). The presence of terrorist groups in the Amazon became a valid 
justification for the army to treat indigenous communities as enemies of the state. 
The San Martín region also suffered the consequences of another armed group known as 
the Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA). For Abad, the presence of MRTA 
generated a setback in the organization process of the Amazonian population there. According to 
Abad, for years boats had to pay a “revolutionary tax” for navigating the rivers, the most 
important ways of communication in the region, or MRTA would confiscate them (Abad 2006). 
Indigenous organizations’ leaders were not able to move from one place to another to attend 
meetings or address community issues. Using the argument that indigenous organizations had 
access to outside financial support, MRTA seized the leaders’ boats asking for gallons of fuel as 
a revolutionary tax. MRTA also attacked foreigners involved in development programs. NGO 
representatives and volunteers had to stop their activities. The risk of being kidnapped by the 
MRTA or targeted as an enemy of the army was high: “any foreigner was suspected of terrorism, 
but it was worse if the foreigners were working with indigenous communities in a development 
project” (Abad 2006:94). The period of terrorism isolated many more Amazonian communities, 
as Amazonian indigenous leaders suspended their organizational processes by trying to avoid 
accusations of being enemies of the army, helping terrorist groups, or benefiting from 
international cooperation.  
To sum up, the events documented by Abad in San Martín illustrate what happened in 
other areas of the Amazon region during the armed conflict between Shining Path, MRTA, and 
the army: hundreds of local organizations suspended their activities. All these leaders were 
forced to reduce their activities and to adopt a low profile. These violent actions halted extractive 
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agenda promoted by the central government and presumably the colonization of the region by 
newcomers arriving from neighboring Andean areas. 
 
FUJIMORI 
 
Alberto Fujimori’s government [1990-2001] marked the beginning of neoliberalism in 
Peru. To that end, Fujimori applied a set of laws to privatize land use for the promotion of large-
scale extraction of natural resources like minerals, oil, and natural gas. Although the main goal of 
these policies was to gain state control over the Amazonian territory through the official titling 
process, the process allowed some Amazonian communities to have their territorial rights 
recognized by law. The governmental office in charge of granting land titles was The Special 
Project of Land Titling (PETT).20 On the one hand, international Amazonian advocates who 
delivered a message promoting “Indians” as natural conservationists impacted this office greatly. 
On the other hand, the process of land titling served the promotion of private investment. 
Therefore, some of Amazonian communities gained territorial rights, even when PETT’s actions 
responded to a neoliberal logic seeking to encourage private companies to lease Amazonian 
territory (Greene 2009). In the nineties, Kichwa organizations began a process of territorial 
titling without knowing that it was part of Fujimori’s neoliberal agenda.  
Although Fujimori’s land-use policies resulted in the legalization of the collective rights 
of some indigenous’ territories, PETT prioritized giving personal land titles rather than collective 
ones. In the long run this caused great damage to indigenous organizations because some 
members of the community got their own private property rights while others did not. According 
to the director of the Regional Agrarian Office in charge of the legalization process of 
                                                
20 PETT (Proyecto Especial de Titulación de Tierras). 
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indigenous communities, Kichwa communities with members that already have their own 
property rights cannot obtain communal rights or be legally recognized as a community 
anymore, because private rights cannot overlap with collective rights (Interviewee #42, August 
02, 2012). Official representatives of Fujimori’s government misled the population arguing that 
Kichwas needed first their own personal property rights. After that, according these official 
representatives, private owners could start a subsequent process for the recognition of communal 
rights. As a result of this misleading campaign, the current process of land and political 
recognition has been seriously affected. When some Kichwas gained access to their private or 
individual land titles, they never thought that in doing so they were giving the government an 
excuse to neglect their collective rights in the future.  
Fujimori’s neoliberal agenda also led to the creation of new laws and the amendment of 
the existing ones in order to have economic control over Amazonian territories. The new 
Constitution of 1993 dissolved some of the basic rights to indigenous territories, making them no 
longer indefeasible and inalienable (Roldan and Tamayo 1999). This change in the legislation led 
to another law that was enacted to promote private investment. If investment was deemed in the 
national interest, then the state would allow the leasing of indigenous peoples’ territory.21 
Ironically, the same year the Peruvian government signed the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) Convention Nº169 on the protection of indigenous rights (Roldan and Tamayo 1999). In 
this international agreement the Peruvian government expressed publicly the commitment to 
recognize and protect indigenous ancestral land. Although in the international arena the Peruvian 
government seemed to genuinely care for indigenous peoples, internally Fujimori’s constitution 
was directly opposed to the interests of the Amazonian people. As a result, Fujimori undermined 
                                                
21 Ley # 26505 de Promoción de la Inversión en las Actividades Económicas en las tierras del territorio nacional y 
las comunidades campesinas y nativas [07-18-1995]. 
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the indigenous territorial rights with the implementation of neoliberal policies that are still 
deleteriously affecting Amazonians.  
After Fujimori, the governments of Alejandro Toledo [2001-2006] and Alan García 
[2006-2011] continued granting exploration and the leasing of concessions to international 
private companies. Although by 1999 the indigenous territories had been legally subdivided into 
1,175 land titles for indigenous communities and 5 natural reserves (Finer and Orta-Martínez 
2010), in total it represented just 13 percent of the Amazonian territory (Greene 2009). In 2003, 
7.1 percent of the Peruvian Amazon was under private concessions. However, the political and 
economic clout of international oil companies has grown exponentially. In 2009 alone, 52 new 
oil concessions were registered. As a result, the 88 percent of concessions given by the 
government to private investors overlap with titled indigenous lands and with territorial reserves 
for indigenous people living in voluntary isolation (Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010). Now the 
conflict between indigenous peoples and private companies requires a strong organization able to 
protect what is left of the Amazonian territories. Today those indigenous organizations are 
looking for a political strategy that could protect them from the invasion of outsiders’ economic 
interests. 
The increasing entry of outsiders into the Amazon has motivated indigenous groups to 
seek official recognition for their lands. Rather than simply aiming at a greater control of their 
lands, Amazonians are also trying to reaffirm their identity as an indigenous group. Either 
because indigenous leaders have more information from NGOs about the benefits of having their 
lands titled, or because the harm caused by deforestation has become more apparent than ever, 
indigenous peoples have felt compelled to organize politically. Therefore, their political struggle 
based on land claims implies also the need to reinterpret what it means to be indigenous (Killick  
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2008). In a context where the Amazonians have been systematically neglected by several 
governments, for indigenous communities to gain land titles represents a huge success that 
reaffirms their identity and autonomy as a group. As a result, the organizational process for land 
titling also means the reconstruction and promotion of a communal identity. This communal 
identity has depended on several characteristics such as the ability to speak Kichwa and have 
bilingual schools, the recognition of the apu as the head of the community rather than the state’s 
representatives, and the participation in communal assemblies.  
 
GARCÍA 
 
Alan García’s government [1985-1990, 2006-2011] demonstrated how a neoliberal 
approach to the Amazon’s natural resources implies the rejection of indigenous peoples’ basic 
rights. In his second government García enacted a series of legislative decrees designed to please 
the agenda of the extractive industry. Between October and November of 2007, he published a 
series of three opinion articles in the most influential Peruvian newspaper –El Comercio– under 
the title “The Dog in the Manger Syndrome.”22 In these articles, Alan García expressed his view 
of the Amazon and presented his model of economic development, despising the peasant and 
indigenous communities in the Andes as well as in the Amazon region (Hughes 2010). 
According to García, indigenous communities were self-serving organizations and enemies of 
modernization. García’s idea was that foreign companies were the only ones able to guarantee 
high levels of sustainability by using appropriate technology for the exploitation of the 
Amazon’s natural resources. In García’s view, the Amazonian territories were a potential source 
                                                
22 In Perú, “the dog in the manger” is a common expression used to describe those who begrudge others from what 
they are not using or enjoying. 
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of wealth for all Peruvians and the indigenous were selfish, ignorant, and lazy, keeping the rest 
of Peruvians in poverty (Rénique 2009). These articles reaffirmed the historical point of view of 
the economic and political elites about the Amazonian people.  
Between 2007 and 2008, García worked with the Peruvian Congress to modify the 
national laws and thus comply with a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States 
(Meléndez and Leon 2010). Some of his decrees lowered the legal requirements for the purchase 
and sale of indigenous lands in the Andes and the Amazon region. For example, these decrees 
decreased the number of votes needed in an indigenous community to sell their collective 
property. Other decrees gave legal power to the Peruvian State to recover uncultivated lands in 
the hands of indigenous communities and decrease the area of protected natural areas 
(Bebbington 2009). By the end of the 2008 the Amazon population led by AIDESEP were now 
prepared and experienced as an organization to counter the Peruvian government’s assault. Their 
reaction was immediate, decrying that that these decrees served international investors in their 
exploitation of the Amazon. In August 2008, a number of Amazonian indigenous communities 
protested publicly claiming that the government decrees were promulgated without consulting 
indigenous communities (Bebbington 2009). According to the agreements between the Peruvian 
government and the ILO Convention 169, indigenous peoples have the right to consultation 
about developmental projects affecting their territories.  
Because the Peruvian government failed to comply with this agreement, the Amazonian 
leaders along with the Peruvian Ombudsman Office requested the Constitutional Court to rescind 
the decrees as unconstitutional (Greene 2009b). The Amazonians knew that “the decrees 
eliminated the last legal resource available to indigenous peoples to protect their territorial 
integrity” (Rénique 2009:6). They then started a wave of protests lasting eleven days and 
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finishing when the Peruvian Congress repealed some of the decrees in question. However, 
AIDESEP maintained its original position in which all decrees threatening the lands of 
indigenous communities must be rescinded (Bebbington 2009). AIDESEP’s response to García’s 
decrees for the defense of their territories inspired a national process of organization among 
Amazonian indigenous leaders. Although different indigenous groups protested in their own way 
in their own regions, all cohesively followed the directives of AIDESEP’s leader, Alberto 
Pizango. In San Martín, according to Kichwa leaders, all the ethnicities, the Kichwas, Shawis, 
and Awajun, blocked the most important highways in tandem with other indigenous groups from 
neighboring provinces (Interviewee #12, June 13, 2011). However, these protests did not thwart 
the government (Meléndez and Leon 2010). Therefore, in 2009 AIDESEP launched a new wave 
of protests in ten of the twenty-five regions of Peru. 
During this new wave of protests, Amazon indigenous peoples occupied oil and gas 
pumping stations and hydroelectric plants, shutting down commercial navigation in the rivers 
and blocking the most important bridges and highways connecting the Amazon region with the 
rest of the country (Bebbington 2009). These actions met the objective of calling the attention of 
the highest levels of government. As a result, a new dialogue started between the president of the 
Council of Ministers and the leader of AIDESEP, Alberto Pizango. Although the indigenous 
leaders considered the dialogue as a good sign, the government representatives wanted to stop 
the protests without changing the decrees. For these government representatives, the indigenous 
had to understand that the development of the country depended on the Amazon’s natural 
resources. The protest continued for several days.23 Because the negotiations reached a dead end, 
                                                
23 Two major ethnic groups from the Amazon, the Wampis and the Awajun, took the Station No. 6 of the North 
Peruvian oil pipeline by force, located in the city of Bagua. This pipeline is the main source of petroleum in Perú. 
The Wampis and the Awajun promised not to harm the industrial installation or the police officials who were taken 
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the government announced a “state of emergency” in five most critical areas, affecting the 
geographical center of the indigenous mobilization (Rénique 2009). In this “state of emergency” 
the government suspended the most basic civil rights. In turn, the indigenous leader, Alberto 
Pizango, declared the communities’ right to insurgency. The government’s refusal to recognize 
the Amazonians’ right to protect their territory motivated other grassroots organizations to 
publicly support the Amazonians’ struggle. 
The Ombudsman’s Office tried to mediate between the government and AIDESEP, and 
once more Pizango publicly pledged to seek a legal solution to the conflict. However, this new 
phase of dialogue ended after just two days when the Minister of Justice requested the arrest of 
Alberto Pizango for conspiracy and terrorism (Bebbington 2009). Pizango sought asylum in 
Nicaragua, and the ruling political party –APRA– took advantage by blocking congressional 
debate proposed to repeal the decrees. On the morning of June 5, 2009, a police squad tried to 
recover a major stretch of highway called the Devil’s Bend24 in the city of Bagua. This highway 
links the Amazon with the Andes. The police opened fire from helicopters at 5:00 a.m. The 
indigenous people repelled the attack with spears and arrows (Rénique 2009). That morning, 
nine indigenous peoples and twelve police officers died at Devil’s Bend.25 Thus, what started as 
a promising negotiation, in which the Amazonian communities were using their political 
representative to defend their territories through legal arguments for the first time in history, 
ended in the state’s violent repression. 
                                                                                                                                                       
as hostages. The indigenous people’s aim was to stop pumping activities in the Amazon without permission, not to 
destroy the station. 
24 Curva del Diablo. 
25 One hundred and sixty-nine indigenous and mestizo civilians and 31 police were injured. However, the official 
number of indigenous dead is unreliable. Indigenous communities insist that more died, and many witnesses claimed 
to have seen a “clean-up operation” (Greene, 2009). According to these witnesses, dozens of body-bags were taken 
away using helicopters and the cadavers were thrown into the rivers. These allegations have not been confirmed 
because the military and police restricted access to the area. 
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The events of the Devil’s Bend attracted support from foreign human rights 
organizations. Even in Lima, the Bagua protest became a turning point for some sectors of the 
civil society who severely criticized the government's actions. Some leaders from the coastal 
areas and the Andes joined the Amazonian leaders in demanding the rescinding of the decrees. 
President García and his ministers publicly criminalized the Bagua protest, claiming that 
indigenous peoples were traitors to the nation because their aim was to gain the independence of 
the Amazon territories from Peru. The central government also accused the Amazonians of 
blockading the cities, preventing them from getting food, cutting off their electricity, and 
crippling fuel distribution (Rénique 2009:8). Furthermore, AIDESEP was depicted as an 
organization serving the interests of Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez (presidents of Bolivia and 
Venezuela, respectively). However, the government succumbed to national indignation and 
international pressure and all García’s decrees were annulled.  
The aftermath of the Bagua protest had varying impacts on Peruvians. Amazonian 
indigenous organizations, NGOs, and government representatives agreed that it is a landmark. 
For some, the Bagua protest demonstrated the strength of the Amazonian indigenous 
organizations, for others it represented the first thing they knew about the Amazonians’ struggle 
over their territories (Bebbington 2009). Although García and the majority of the government 
representatives did not take responsibility for what happened in Bagua, some ministers resigned. 
According to my interviewees, the protest has been an inspiration to continue their struggle 
(Interviewee #28, January 11, 2012). Others think that people from the Andes and the coast 
respect them more, realizing how much they need the Amazon for their survival: “before the 
Bagua protest, people did not care about us, but after they spent almost one month without access 
of food because of the blockage, they started to think about the fruits that they like in their 
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breakfast, and all the things they get from the Amazon” (Interviewee #21, June 06, 2011). For 
NGO representatives, the protest opened new opportunities for funding more projects. 
Consequently, Bagua set the foundation for a more critical view of the government’s role.  
 
HUMALA 
 
The presidential campaign of 2010 proved that Peruvians wanted a change in the 
economic policy. Just one year after the Bagua protest, Peruvians had to choose between two 
candidates. One was the daughter of the former president Alberto Fujimori who until today is in 
jail for violating human rights while in office, and the other was Ollanta Humala, leader of the 
“Nationalist Party.”26 At that time, Ollanta Humala openly rejected neoliberal policies that had 
damaged the country since the 90s. His campaign promised a more inclusive government and a 
halt to the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources. Humala’s support grew rapidly in 
provinces where peasant and indigenous organizations had conflicts with extractive companies. 
According to Kichwa leaders, one of the promises that ensured the Amazonians’ support to 
Humala was the Consultation Law. He assured that, as president, he would focus on the 
country’s most vulnerable people.27 Despite the rejection of the most influential newspapers and 
television channels, and after facing stiff competition, Humala won the elections. As a result, 
Amazonian indigenous groups were excited, expecting the new government to finally include 
them in the national agenda. 
Humala’s first months as president (from August to November in 2011) represented a 
major change in Amazonians’ legal framework. In November of 2011, Humala signed two bills, 
                                                
26 PartidoNacionalista. 
27  CNN World. June 06, 2011. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-06/world/peru.runoff_1_ollanta-humala-keiko-
fujimori-peruvian-presidential-election?_s=PM:WORLD 
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one for the enactment of the Consultation Law28 and the other for the creation of the Ministry of 
Inclusion.29 The Consultation Law signified for the Amazonians the legal framework that 
allowed people to have a say when it comes to decisions about certain investments, plans or 
projects that would affect their rights. As a sign of consideration to Amazonians, Humala went to 
the city of Bagua to make public the laws; thousands of indigenous peoples were waiting for 
him. The enactment of the laws confirmed indigenous peoples’ expectations for the great change 
that Humala had promised. According to Kichwa leaders, they finally meant a change of 
mentality in Peruvian’s ruling class. The law was in tune with all international obligations 
established in Convention Nº169 of ILO and opened a new window of dialogue between the 
indigenous peoples and government representatives, which meant more political participation for 
the inhabitants of the Amazon.  
Humala’s creation of the Ministry of Social Inclusion also seemed to be a sign in favor of 
indigenous peoples and marginalized groups. The purpose of the Ministry was to lessen the gap 
between the rich and the poor. Historically, the high levels of economic gains generated by direct 
foreign investments had not trickled down to the lower sectors of the population. In the same 
vein as the creation of the Ministry, every governmental institution –including the Regional 
Government of San Martín and local municipalities– created internal offices to address issues 
related to indigenous peoples or minorities groups.  
Nevertheless, the honeymoon between the president Humala and the Peruvians ended 
after four months.30 As I will show later, most of these offices did not have the support or the 
political willingness needed to function effectively. The creation of these offices responded to a 
                                                
28 Ley # 29785. Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios (November 14th, 2011). 
29 Ley # 29792. Ley del creación, organización y funciones del Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social –MIDIS– 
(October 20th, 2011). 
30 La Primera, June 18, 2012. Ollanta Humala: ¿Cuándo cambió? 
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specific directive, but it was not carried out in a way that actually enhanced the participation for 
the most vulnerable sectors of Peruvian society. As for the Consultation Law, it passed without 
the agreement of indigenous leaders, peasant organizations, and other civil society 
representatives. Ironically, the Law did not properly consult those it intended to benefit. This 
Consultation Law, rather than creating spaces for indigenous peoples’ participation, has the 
potential to limit their participation.31 Today indigenous groups are still fighting to change the 
terms of that law, because as it is, it undermines indigenous peoples’ autonomy.32 For example, 
one article states that the result of consultation among the people is “not binding,” which means 
that the state will take the final decision regarding the implementation of an investment project in 
indigenous jurisdictions. In addition, the state lacks procedures and human resources to 
implement a consultation process (Monge 2012:378). 
According to Kichwa leaders, President Humala has forgotten all of his promises, and the 
ones that he kept are not rigorously enforced. The inclusion of the indigenous peoples in the 
national agenda is not yet a reality (Interviewee #21, June 06, 2011). Other than the first gestures 
of inclusion from the government, there has been no real change in the way that president 
Humala is leading the country. Rather, he continues to act like just another president of the 
Peruvians coastal elites.33 At the same time, Humala’s initial promises sparked political action in 
the Amazon, and today several indigenous organizations are trying to find a strategy to counter 
his “double discourse.”34 As we will see in the next chapter, Kichwas are facing complex 
challenges as a result. Many leaders feel proud to have jobs in governmental offices, but others 
feel tricked by the government’s ineffective measures. 
                                                
31 El Comercio, April 09, 2012. Aidesep insiste en modificación de Ley de Consulta Previa. 
32 El Comercio, April 04, 2012. Indígenas cuestionan reglamento de la Ley de Consulta Previa.  
33 El Comercio, June 05, 2012. Humala cambió por la presión de grupos de poder, afirma congresista Verónika 
Mendoza. 
34 La República, March 13, 2013. Humala: Mi gobierno a veces vira a la izquierda y otras a la derecha. 
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CHAPTER IV: TWELVE CHALLENGES OF KICHWA ORGANIZATIONS  
 
This chapter examines twelve fundamental challenges Kichwa organizations, known as 
federations, experience in their quest to gain formal recognition of their territories. I assess how 
the government’s representatives, the NGOs, and the Kichwa federation leaders in San Martín 
play critical roles in the Kichwa struggle to defend their rights to land and resources. An analysis 
of the complex socio-political milieu in which the Kichwa organizations operate reveals why it 
has been so difficult for them to unify and coordinate their efforts in the common goal of 
achieving their territorial recognition. Although all the Kichwa leaders would like to create a 
common political platform, their organizations still have many obstacles to unification. Due to 
problems of leadership style, NGO influence, and lack of government will in granting the 
Kichwas’ official recognition, the Kichwa organizations have not reached the consensus needed 
to tailor an effective strategy to gain political leverage. Until the Kichwa organizations can build 
strength through sustained unity, it will be very difficult to effectively defend their territorial 
rights. As I argue in this chapter, this desired political unity is still elusive but it is an open 
possibility. These federations united momentarily to great effect in 2009 supporting the Bagua 
protest, and in 2012 to defend a large common area known as “Cordillera Escalera.” 
Another important challenge that this chapter examines is the ambiguity of the 
government's actions towards Kichwa peoples. While the government is including Kichwa 
leaders in governmental positions, it is also leasing the Kichwa territories, dividing the Kichwa 
leadership, and making it harder for Kichwa leaders to unify. The presence of oil companies and 
illegal settlers continues to damage the environment. On top of that, the Kichwa organizations’ 
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interest in maintaining political independence unique cultural values is in jeopardy because of 
the government’s neoliberal policies that undermine the Kichwas’ land rights. For the Kichwas 
their cultural inheritance is attached to the land. The legal protection of their territories means the 
protection of their cultural traits and vice versa. Today, the Kichwas are divided on what position 
to take with the government. 
 
NATIVE COMMUNITIES, FEDERATIONS & NGOs 
 
 Land struggles in the Amazon cannot be understood without knowing why those sharing 
the same language, territory, and cultural traits are seeking official recognition as native 
communities. According to the Law Nº 20653, a native community (comunidad nativa) is an 
Amazonian socio-economic unit marked by cultural and linguistic characteristics with a common 
territory (Roldan and Tamayo 2005; Greene 2009). If a settlement, or a group of inhabitants, 
gains legal recognition as a native community, all the territory occupied by them becomes one 
large geographical unit. With the recognition, all the members become “users” of their personal 
plots of land, and the community, as a legally recognized organization, becomes the “owner” of 
the land. In this way, native groups can consolidate their social and economic autonomy.  
 For the Kichwas of San Martin, to be legally recognized as native communities is the best 
way to guarantee the possession of their ancestral territories and block illegal settlers from the 
Andes looking for timber and extractive corporations looking for minerals and oil. Individual 
land titles of small farm plots or chacras do not provide much legal protection. The large 
geographical area inhabited by the Kichwas cannot be guaranteed by a patchy collection of 
separate tiny plots of land. Moreover, individual or disjointed legal recognition does not match 
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the cultural practices of the indigenous groups in this part of the Amazon. The history of the 
Kichwas in San Martin can be traced back to the end of the sixteenth century when the Jesuit 
missionaries first arrived in the area (Barclay 2001). For generations since, Kichwas have 
cultivated gardens, hunted, fished, and collected salt and medicinal plants as distinct socio-
economic units throughout this region they considered their own. Gaining recognition as native 
communities Kichwas can preserve their traditional customs. Occupying the territory organized 
in large geographical and legal units, they can preserve the ecosystem that has been providing 
their means of subsistence. As a patchy collection of tiny owners they cannot protect their rivers, 
their mountains or their forests. 
This is why during the last ten years Kichwa settlements have increasingly sought and in 
some cases received recognition as native communities. The latest information gathered at the 
Regional Government of San Martín reports the existence of 40 out of the 250 Kichwa 
settlements Kichwa native communities that have completed all the paperwork required to 
become official native communities (Interviewee #33, July 20, 2012). Today, Kichwa leaders are 
working so that more Kichwa communities gain formal recognition as native communities.  
 Their main strategy has been to cluster themselves into umbrella organizations called 
federations. The more communities a federation has, the more representative and powerful it 
becomes and the greater the possibilities to be successfully heard by central government 
representatives, municipal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and political parties.  
However, the process has been anything but smooth. For example, in the last three years 
CEPKA, one federation, has assisted 20 Kichwa communities in obtaining formal recognition as 
native communities, but without title to their land because the government had already leased it 
to outsiders. Another problem is that the more federations there are, the more fragmented they 
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become. More complicated still, each federation develops different strategies to deal with 
municipal mayors, non-governmental organizations, and national political parties, and as soon 
one federation loses legitimacy in front of their members, some leaders split and create a new 
federation offering different solutions and better representation. As such, the tendency is towards 
more federations, not consolidation.  In this chapter I will go in depth about twelve challenges 
that the four Kichwa federations working in San Martin (FEPIKRESAM, CEPKA, FEKHID, and 
FEPIKECHA) are facing in order to gain territorial rights. 
The reviewed literature assumes that NGOs and indigenous organizations focus their 
activities exclusively in environmental affairs. Nevertheless, this assumption does not always fit 
the reality of the organizations working in the Amazon. The NGOs most involved with the 
political process of Kichwa federations in San Martin are six: CAAAP, Waman Wasi, Urku, the 
Institute for the Development of Amazonian Peace (IDPA), Peace and Hope, and International 
Conservation (CI). By interviewing representatives of these six NGOs, I found out that these 
organizations do not only focus on environmental affairs. These NGOs have a very 
heterogeneous agenda including topics related with legal advice, human rights advocacy, 
protection of biodiversity, bilingual education, and agricultural development. Conservationist 
practices are part of these NGOs’ agendas. It would be an oversimplification to assume that these 
NGOs just focus on conservation issues.  
 
CHALLENGE #01: GAINING THE STATUS OF NATIVE COMMUNITY 
 
Although Kichwa leaders promote the legalization of native communities, the 
discrimination that indigenous peoples have suffered from the state and the mestizo population 
has discouraged the Kichwas from embracing an indigenous identity. Among the Kichwas, “the 
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increase of the mestizo population has caused some Kichwas to no longer want to dress as a 
Kichwa, speak Kichwa, or have their children attend bilingual schools. Instead, the Kichwas 
preferred to sell their land and migrate to central cities” (Calderon 2003:47). An ex-leader of 
CEPKA explained: “Some say that they are not natives anymore, that they no longer speak 
Kichwa, and that to be called a native community is a throwback” (Interviewee #10, July 12, 
2011). Indigenous leaders have been trying to overcome the mestizos’ prejudices by encouraging 
the Kichwa communities to value their identity, explaining that as a native community they can 
obtain their territorial rights. As a result, an increasing number of Kichwas are beginning to 
participate in the process of organization for native community status.  
Weakened amendments to the Law of Native Communities have also disheartened 
Kichwas from pursuing native community status. Fifteen years ago, native communities in San 
Martín had access to certain benefits beyond the formal recognition of communal territory, such 
as job opportunities and scholarships. Today, all Kichwa leaders agree that those benefits are less 
accessible and thus have dampened motivations for applying for native community status. 
Consequently, the federations still do not representing the majority of the Kichwa people and are 
doubted by many Kichwa apus themselves.  
Part of the reticence to pursue official native community status is the exhaustive and 
expensive application process. Kichwa communities need a lot of resources to become a native 
community. For a Kichwa community to start the process of official recognition, at least 300 US 
dollars are needed to pay lawyers to fill out and submit the paperwork for application. Moreover, 
the Kichwas need to submit a document in which all members of the community have signed 
their agreement, and they need to draw a map of their territory. All of this is intimidating and 
discouraging.  
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Kichwa communities do not have maps to demonstrate the extension of their territories. 
Although the main goal of the Kichwa communities is to claim their territorial rights, they do not 
have the resources to create maps that would serve as the main document to support their 
demands. Instead, they have to rely on the government’s maps, which were made in 2003 
without considering Kichwa perspectives (Interviewee #38, July 30, 2012). Therefore, the limits 
of a Kichwa territory depend on the government official’s point of view rather than the Kichwas 
knowledge about their lands. As a result, the government takes advantage of the inability of the 
Kichwa communities to draw their own maps, which allows the government to continue leasing 
the Kichwa territories to the extractive industry or to timber companies. 
Additionally, government officials are telling the Kichwas that by becoming a formal 
native community, they will lose their individual plots of land, called chacras. An ex-leader 
explained: “When the leaders ask for the formal recognition of their communities, the 
government official frightens them by telling that if they want to become a native community 
they must give up their personal titles of their plots” (Interviewee #16, July 10, 2011). 
The official recognition of native community status depends on the willingness of an 
inspector to verify and write a report with his recommendations about the validity of the 
application. This process is problematic because the recognition of native communities 
ultimately is determined by government officials’ expectations of what “indigenous” mean. 
According to the Kichwa leaders, inspectors do not know enough about them to really 
understand their cultural practices, and because of that they deny the applications. The ex-
President of CEPKA expressed indignation when the government denied the application of one 
Kichwa community: “the inspector cannot deprive us of being native community.  It is like 
denying that we are alive. Even though we invited him (the inspector) to lunch and showed him 
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how we live, he still believed we were not an indigenous community anymore. That is why we 
had to fight back” (Interviewee #16, July 10, 2011).  
 
CHALLENGE #02: THE FEDERATIONS’ ROLE 
 
Different opinions among leaders have been raised about what should be the federations’ 
role. The old federations believe they should only represent groups organized as native 
communities (holding or seeking this legal status). The new federations want to open the 
representation to all the Kichwa peoples (organized in native communities, or not). When the 
first federation –FEPIKRESAM– started, its role was the political representation of native 
communities. Then, because FEPIKRESAM did not represent the majority of the Kichwas (only 
eight native communities), a group of leaders split from FEPIKRESAM to create CEPKA to 
continue encouraging Kichwa communities to gain native community status. For the ex-president 
of CEPKA, CEPKA’s role was to help the Kichwa communities get formal recognition even if 
today that title does not guarantee the legal access to their common territories (Interviewee #16, 
July 10, 2011). For some leaders, the recognition of native community status is a necessary first 
step in strengthening Kichwa federations. Representing more native communities enables the 
federations to become visible actors at the regional and national level. Due to the low percentage 
of Kichwa communities that have managed to achieve native community status, some leaders 
have rejected this limiting approach.  
A new way of understanding the role of the federations has been to incorporate all the 
Kichwa grassroots organizations into the federations, regardless of whether they are registered as 
native communities. The President of the new federation called FEKHID explained: “the 
federation has to be at the forefront to fight for the interests of the majority, and sadly the native 
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communities just represent a small part of the Kichwa people” (Interviewee #08, July 11, 2011). 
In one year of operation, FEKHID has incorporated four native communities with official status, 
four others, one organization of bilingual teachers, and another of healthcare workers. The 
different strategies followed by Kichwa leaders to recruit for their federations has resulted in 
different approaches to get their territorial rights, which makes it more difficult for Kichwa 
leaders to reach political consensus.  
 
CHALLENGE #03: COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FEDERATIONS & COMMUNITIES 
 
Due to the lack of communication between the leaders of the Kichwa federations and the 
local Kichwa inhabitants, the latter do not always feel they are rightfully represented by the 
former. Despite the Kichwa leaders’ efforts to get closer to their constituencies, they do not have 
travel funds to make the long and expensive trips to the remote Kichwa communities 
(Interviewee #23, July 08, 2011, and Interviewee #16, July 10, 2011). In the case of CEPKA, the 
president tries very hard to build a strong relationship with the majority of the Kichwa 
communities, but reaching 30 native communities that are geographically so dispersed implies an 
investment of money and time that leaders do not have. In one of the internal meetings that I 
attended, the president of one federation was discouraged by the low number of participants. He 
was expecting at least nine leaders of native communities (apus), but only four could make it 
(Participant Observation #09, July 29, 2012). After the meeting he realized the only way to make 
sure these apus will show up is by inviting them in person: “going by boat would get me faster to 
these communities than walking, but I don’t have the money to pay the gas for the boat” 
(Interviewee #36, July 29, 2012). Despite these difficulties, some of the federations’ leaders try 
to have at least one meeting every year by offering the apus some kind of financial aid so can 
 50 
travel. These leaders believe some day their organizations would have their own funds to hire a 
person in charge of going to each of the communities. 
 
CHALLENGE #04: CREATION OF NEW FEDERATIONS 
 
The Kichwa communities’ strategy of seeking better political representation is to create 
their own federations. Both the Kichwas who used to be part of an existing federation and the 
ones who have never been part of a federation have stated their intentions to create their own 
federations. Three years ago there were only fifteen Kichwa native communities grouped in two 
federations, but today there are fifty-five native communities grouped into four federations, 
helping overcome the sense of exclusion felt by some Kichwa communities in the past. For 
example, the creation of FEPIKECHA happened when the leader of a native community that was 
part of an older federation, CEPKA, told another leader that he was tired of been ignored by 
CEPKA (Interviewee #36, July 29, 2012). The expansion of federations, however, also means 
that Kichwas are becoming more divided, which can result in internal competition rather than 
unification for the original goal: the legal recognition of their territories.  
New federations also represent an increase in the number of Kichwa leaders, which 
means the need of a higher level of organizational complexity. So far, they have to be able to sit 
and talk with other leaders to coordinate their demands, but open dialogue and achieving 
consensus are not easy. This “multiplication” or “proliferation” of leaders sets the grounds for 
the governmental representatives to accuse the Kichwa federations of not being able to clarify 
their goals or of not being able to expound a clear agenda. As a consequence, each one of the 
Kichwa federations projects the impression of being “selfish,” looking after its own interests first 
(Interviewee #25, January 14, 2012). 
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CHALLENGE #05: NEW LEADERS VERSUS OLD LEADERS 
 
The existence of new federations with new leaders emanates from the population’s 
dissatisfaction with older organizations. Because the educational levels are very low for most 
Kichwa people, they value leaders who have obtained university degrees, whereas previous 
leaders had little formal education whatsoever. For the young, educated Kichwas, the lack of 
formal education usually means that the leaders do not have the best qualifications to represent 
them. When FEPIKRESAM and CEPKA started, the Kichwa leaders, who were bilingual 
teachers, had the highest degree of education then available. Today, some young Kichwas are 
lawyers and engineers. They are less inclined to follow leaders with comparatively little 
education. As the young alderman of the Municipality of Lamas states:  
These organizations need to include young people in their leadership. That would 
be the only way for the Kichwa peoples to have more opportunities in the future. 
The elderly members in charge of CEPKA do not have the best qualities to be in 
those political positions. They do not know how to write proposals to get more 
funding. Now the young people are more prepared to do the job, they know how 
to use the internet and how to find financial support from other agencies. 
(Interviewee #29, January 18, 2012) 
 
On the other hand, an important segment of the Kichwa population believes the younger 
leaders do not share the knowledge of the Kichwa traditions and value the territory. Most of the 
time, the young generations had to leave their communities when they were six years old to 
study and work in the nearby urban centers; therefore, their values come from an urban lifestyle. 
All of the NGOs’ representatives agreed that, despite the respect felt by most of the Kichwa 
people for these young leaders, the young leaders do not represent the majority of the Kichwas 
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who live in the rural areas known as chacareros.35 The incompatibility between the ideals of the 
people that value formal education and the need for leaders who can value Kichwa traditional 
culture creates a gap between current Kichwa leaders.  
The bilingual teachers’ organizations are one group of actors that can cross the divide 
between leaders who have formal education and those who do not. The bilingual teachers’ 
organizations are the oldest in the region, created thirty years ago to preserve the Kichwa 
language challenged by the Spanish educational system. Though the bilingual teachers started 
the process of political organization, creating the first two federations to demand rights to 
territory, health care, and bilingual education, they are not very popular among the indigenous 
communities. According to the current Kichwa leaders that are not schoolteachers, most of the 
people in the communities have felt discriminated by the bilingual teachers.36 
The lack of communication between the bilingual teachers and the federation leaders has 
created a gap for these two groups that prevents them from having a working relationship despite 
their shared goals and complementary inputs. Bilingual teachers have been relegated to their 
schools, and just recently some Kichwa leaders are inviting these teachers to participate in the 
federation’s meetings. On one hand, the federations need a bilingual education system to become 
articulate as Kichwas. The importance of the bilingual education system to defend themselves is 
recognized by the apus. On the other hand, the bilingual teachers’ organizations need the 
federations to have more impact in changing the national educational policies. The exclusion of 
the bilingual teachers from the Kichwa organizations’ planning is a huge loss that the leaders 
have not been able to compensate.  
                                                
35 Chacareros is the common term used to talk about the Kichwa peoples who live in their plots of land (chacras). 
They are well known for their knowledge about medicinal plants and agriculture techniques.  
36 In the past, these teachers were unwilling to release the control of the federations, despite the apus’ desire to have 
different leaders. This reluctance has left a bad memory in the current leaders’ minds. 
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Another complicating factor is that the bilingual education system in the region is 
undeveloped, which is turn weakens the communities and the reputation of the bilingual 
teachers. Although some of the communities have elementary schools, which are part of the 
bilingual system, the Kichwa teaching is still incipient. At the time of my visit, the children had 
just one hour of Kichwa every week. Because the bilingual teachers are a small number 
compared to the regular teachers, they cannot compete against the education system that has no 
interest of teaching Kichwa. Even when the bilingual teachers work in a school that supports 
bilingual education, they are forced to follow the Ministry of Education’s guidelines for teaching 
Kichwa. As the bilingual teachers expressed, the problem with following those guidelines is that 
the Kichwa specialists in the Ministry of Education have no clue about the Kichwa from the 
Amazon. For a bilingual teacher: “the specialists in bilingual education who work in Lima just 
know about the Kichwa from the Andes region, which is very different from our Kichwa, and 
because they think our Kichwa is just a dialect, they want us to change the way we teach 
Kichwa” (Interviewee #17, July 09, 2011). As a result, the children in the communities are not 
learning Kichwa literacy. When more and more Kichwas are turning to Spanish, the leaders have 
more problems demonstrating that they are truly Kichwas when seeking indigenous status.  
 
CHALLENGE #06: THE INFLUENCE OF NGOs 
 
The NGOs in San Martín have provided Kichwa organizations with money, projects, and 
technical and legal support. These NGOs have been able to help Kichwas through the formation 
of federations, seeking to attend a heterogeneous list of grievances related with citizenship 
recognition, agricultural assistance, cultural preservation, and environmental conservation. It 
should be noticed that the literature assumes that NGOs and indigenous organizations focus their 
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activities exclusively in environmental affairs. This assumption does not necessarily match 
reality. For domestic NGOs working in San Martin Region, as well as for the Kichwa 
federations, environmental claims are inseparable from political, territorial, and cultural claims. 
The representative of the oldest NGO in San Martín (CAAAP) remembered all the 
resources needed to help the Kichwas organize themselves in a federation such as 
FEPIKRESAM (Interviewee #06, June 09, 2011). Still today, the federations rely solely on 
NGOs for funding and support, reflecting a high degree of dependency. For example, the newest 
federation, FEKHID, was created with the help of the NGO Urku, whose agenda it is to promote 
projects regarding agricultural activities. Urku provides the necessary scientific knowledge via 
the contracting of field engineers for the preservation of the Kichwas’ land and animals. In turn, 
FEKHID’s agenda includes becoming more competitive in agricultural marketing. 
The Kichwas are convinced that the most effective way to acquire NGO resources is 
through organization. This constitutes an additional incentive for Kichwas to join a federation: 
the main goal is to obtain or defend territorial rights and this is supposed to be obtained by 
joining a federation strongly linked to NGOs. The director of Urku explains: “Recently CEPKA 
is grouping several Kichwa communities, and that seems like good news; the problem is that 
these communities are joining the federation because they think they will be able to get some 
benefit from the NGO that is working with that federation” (Interviewee #05, June 09, 2011). 
The increasing number of Kichwas wanting to be part of federations has generated high 
expectations of getting benefits from NGOs. Consequently, when NGOs fail to provide resources 
for all the communities, they respond by withdrawing support to the federations. 
To the leaders the NGO’s relationship represents an opportunity for them to secure the 
approval of their constituencies. The leaders who have the ability to find different sources of 
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funding tend to be the most popular. The leaders agreed that when the Kichwa communities feel 
the federations do not have NGO support, they automatically think the leaders are not working 
hard enough. The leaders really care about their communities’ approval because there is little 
from stopping them from switching their allegiance to another federation. 
As a matter of fact, this loss of credibility among the leaders, those who are supposed to 
be connected with NGOs, constitutes a factor in explaining the creation of new federations. The 
president of FEPIKECHA describes the way they started the newest federation: “We always had 
the idea of creating a federation from Chazuta district, but we got serious about it when the apu 
of the native community, Tuluntulumba, approached me with the idea of creating FEPIKECHA 
to get funding from NGOs” (Interviewee #36, July 29, 2012). The increasing number of new 
federations in the region reveals the inability of the leaders to maintain the unity within existing 
ones. Despite the limited resources given by NGOs, some leaders would rather create a new 
federation than wait for their share of the NGOs’ benefits.  
The belief among the Kichwas that NGOs have a lot of money to give to federations 
produces a conflict between the communities and their leaders due to envy. The NGOs’ 
representatives and the Kichwa leaders agree seeing NGOs only as a source of money is quite 
detrimental to the functioning of federations. The relationship the Kichwa leaders have with 
NGOs generates two types of feelings: one is that the Kichwas think their leaders are 
appropriating the resources provided by NGOs, and the other is that the Kichwas think their 
leaders are not prepared enough to compete against other federations for those resources. As a 
result, the NGO’s assistance may result in a sense of frustration toward Kichwa leaders. 
Therefore, because of competition between leaders and between federations, the unity required to 
seek territorial rights is compromised. 
 56 
Although NGOs’ main activities are related to organizational strengthening, not just 
providing money, Kichwa leaders have been unable to restrain themselves from seeing NGOs as 
economic resources as well as sources of legal advice for strengthening their federations. 
According to the NGOs’ representatives, the federations are not ready to function independently 
without the NGO support. Even if NGOs would like to work with Kichwa leaders in other kinds 
of activities, they realize that federations still need a lot of support to strengthen their 
organizations. Therefore, the NGOs’ main goal is first to strengthen the Kichwa federations and 
then move to other aspects of Kichwa development.  
The Kichwas have blamed the NGOs for encouraging federation leaders to work 
separately instead of together. Considering the NGOs’ limited resources, it is easier for each to 
work with just one federation than to work with all. According to NGO representatives, the 
NGOs cannot afford to help all the Kichwas, so they have to choose which community to support 
based on criteria such as the number of members, the accessibility, etc. However, for the Kichwa 
leaders, the NGOs’ limit their client communities in order to isolate and manipulate Kichwa 
leaders. An ex-leader from CEPKA, describes an example of the divisiveness created by NGO 
Urku:  
When the NGOs cannot work with a federation, because it demands transparency in the 
use of funds from external agencies, then the NGO looks for leaders of other 
communities to manipulate them and to make them create another federation. 
FEPIKRESAM has already lost three native communities, and CEPKA has lost two. The 
NGOs’ interference has divided the federations. That is how FEKHID was created. 
(Interviewee #10, July 09, 2011) 
 
Such a description of the NGOs, portrayed as the ones who manipulate the Kichwa leaders, is 
common among the Kichwa communities.  
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The Kichwa leaders have articulated a contradictory discourse about the role of NGOs; 
while NGOs have helped the Kichwas to organize themselves, the NGOs have overrepresented 
Kichwa organizations. Even if for Kichwa leaders a relationship with NGOs would result in 
more funding opportunities and thus greater popularity among their constituencies, they do not 
want to be too beholden to NGOs for fear of losing their autonomy. According to these leaders, 
NGOs are a necessary evil. As an example of this love-hate relationship with NGOs, the 
President of FEPIKRESAM was very pleased about how the new President of CEPKA was 
giving less attention to NGO demands; as a consequence, CEPKA and FEPIKRESAM were 
getting closer (Interviewee #12, June 13, 2011). The contradictory discourse raises the question 
of how the leaders can balance their relationships with NGOs so they can avoid the conflict 
within the Kichwas without compromising the NGOs’ support.  
Just as federation objectives do not perfectly coincide with NGO ones, the NGOs are 
subject to the international donors that support them. For instance, in San Martín CAAAP is the 
oldest NGO in the region founded with conservative Catholic values supported by the Catholic 
Church. Waman Wasi advocates for the indigenous’ preservation of ancestral practices to 
maintain their traditional livelihood. Finally, Urku supports projects to increase the profitability 
of indigenous agricultural products. These different agendas divide Kichwa efforts and distract 
them from the ultimate goal of territorial recognition. Today, all the leaders agree that they 
should prioritize territorial rights, and the only way they can reach the attention of external 
agencies is by uniting. 
Because the leaders are always attending NGO workshops and meetings, they do not have 
the time to work within their federations or even pass NGO training on to their constituencies. 
As the leaders reflected, everyday they have to meet with somebody different, looking for 
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funding opportunities, without having the time to unify their organizations. By attending 
incessant workshops in distant towns, they sacrifice time needed to work in their own plots, 
spend with their families, and meet with other leaders within their federation. The Kichwa 
leaders must reach all their affiliated communities regularly for short, medium, and long-term 
planning, but they do not have the time or resources to do so. 
 
CHALLENGE #07: KICHWA REPRESENTATION IN THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
Recent regional government initiatives in San Martín to incorporate the representation of 
indigenous peoples in its agenda have raised expectations among the Kichwas seeking territorial 
rights. Today, the possibility of having political representation in regional government offices 
arouses a feeling of success among the Kichwas. For a long time the representatives of the 
regional and national government have denied indigenous peoples the opportunity to participate 
in politics. Since the Bagua protest, the inclusion of the Amazonian indigenous peoples in the 
governmental offices has begun. The director of CAAAP describes this process:  
Six or seven years ago, we had to lobby on behalf of indigenous peoples so they 
could be included in some way. That has changed. Now, because indigenous 
peoples have asked for more participation, there are offices where they are in 
charge. These offices are encouraging the leaders to work on their own proposals 
for projects. This change has been gradual, little by little, and is the result of the 
work they have done over the last 15 years. (Interviewee #06, July 06, 2011) 
 
Today, most of the main government offices in the region have incorporated one office in charge 
of indigenous affairs as part of the Humala government’s policy of including indigenous peoples 
in the national agenda. For these indigenous people having a specific office for the indigenous 
communities is a major breakthrough (Interviewee #30, January 18, 2012). In the case of the 
province of Lamas, this has been possible because for the first time its Mayor with two Kichwa 
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aldermen have passed several laws in favor of indigenous peoples in 2011.37  Some Kichwas 
have mistakenly assumed these new offices were going to solve the Kichwas’ struggle to have 
legal recognition of their land. Instead, what is really happening is that the Kichwas are dividing 
themselves between those who work for the government, and those who do not.  
The NGOs claim the government does not genuinely want to promote indigenous rights 
but was forced by the Bagua protest to show good will towards the indigenous organizations. In 
other words, the creation of new agencies of indigenous affairs and the integration of indigenous 
groups in governmental meetings were consequences of the political pressure felt by the 
government. Although the representatives of these offices are very proud to have those positions 
for the first time in the region’s history, until these offices have the finances to operate, the 
officials cannot effectively work on behalf of the Kichwa people. This kind of limited political 
representation causes more harm than good to the Kichwa organizations that are just starting to 
get political influence at the regional level.  
Because indigenous officials do not have enough resources, or the autonomy to employ 
the little support they get from external agencies, their functions are very limited. The Regional 
Office of Indigenous Affairs (ORDEPISAM)38 is a perfect example because the regional 
government brags about its creation, yet the office would not function without NGO support.39 
Since the regional president wanted to calm the protest, he agreed to create ORDEPISAM. 
However, since the beginning, this office had no support from the regional government, and the 
only way they could function was due to an NGO’s money. The head of this NGO remembered: 
“The Regional Government’s representatives asked us for help to start this office because they 
                                                
37 In 2011, the Municipality of Lamas has passed eleven laws to preserve the Kichwa culture. 
38 ORDEPISAM stands for (Oficina Regional de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas de la Región San Martín). 
39 Although this NGO is different from the ones that have been supporting Kichwa federations because its work in 
San Martin has always been related to forest conservation. It was just after the Bagua protest, that this NGO the 
organization saw an opportunity to allocate money into a different cause such as ORDEPISAM. 
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did not have enough budget. That is why we committed to sponsor the office for one year until 
the office could work with its own money” (Interviewee #31, June 04, 2012).  However, having 
an outside source of funding to start the office also meant the regional government saw no need 
to fund it itself. Since the regional government did not have interest in knowing how the office 
was functioning, “it was like the office did not exist” (Interviewee #25, January 14, 2012). Thus, 
for indigenous officials it has been very frustrating not having the power to do things. They 
always have to coordinate internally with other offices from the regional government, so each 
one of these offices would include the indigenous communities in their projects. Even when from 
time to time this indigenous office has received a budget from the regional government for a few 
activities, the complexity of the bureaucracy prevents it from making an effective use of these 
resources. As a consequence, the Kichwas feel betrayed by the inability of these indigenous 
offices to improve the Kichwas’ conditions. 
The Kichwa officials do not know how to handle the high expectations their communities 
have for them. To be an official puts an indigenous leader in a very compromising position 
(Interviewee #25, January 14, 2012). For the Regional Government, they are the true 
representatives of their people. However, for indigenous peoples they represent the Regional 
Government. Thus, as much as the Kichwas want to participate in government, they get 
discouraged because they do not notice a real change that can solve their marginalized 
conditions. 
The regional administration is not ready to work in a concerted way with indigenous 
offices. The belief that indigenous issues are not related to healthcare, education, and 
infrastructure services makes it impossible for the indigenous offices to work effectively. Other 
non-indigenous regional officials do not agree with the creation of an indigenous office, which 
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draws funds away to less worthy endeavors. The lack of will on the part of some officials to 
fulfill their duties towards indigenous peoples is still very common (Interviewee #26, January 14, 
2012). Therefore, the government’s actions to create indigenous offices without the 
reorganization of every office’s functions do not necessarily result in substantial changes for 
Kichwa communities. In the end, indigenous opinion is irrelevant when the president of the 
regional government distributes the money however he or she sees fit (Interviewee #25, January 
14, 2012), which is why indigenous offices seek NGO funding to function.  
Another reason why these indigenous offices do not function as they should is because 
the Kichwas are still in a process of unification. If all the Kichwas united to coordinate their 
demands, indigenous offices would have a better direction to follow through on Kichwa 
priorities. Therefore, the dispersion of representation among growing Kichwa organizations 
makes communication, unification, and streamlining of demands more difficult (Interviewee 
#19, June 10, 2011). Today the president of ORDEPISAM is trying to promote the unification of 
Kichwa federations (Participant Observation #5, July 21, 2012). He believes that as a single 
Kichwa group they have more opportunities to take advantage of what the government offices 
have to offer, rather than as independent federations (Interviewee #33, July 20, 2012). Thus, an 
alliance between indigenous offices and Kichwa leaders demands federations to overcome as a 
whole their lack of trust of the government so they can all work together for a common agenda.  
The existence of indigenous offices has led to a conflict over who represents indigenous 
peoples’ interests, the NGOs or the indigenous government officials. For the NGOs, the 
government does not have genuine intentions for truly representing the Kichwa people. 
According to the officials, the NGOs have too much influence in the Kichwa organizations’ 
actions and are usurping power that could be concentrated in the government offices. They 
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argue, in fact, that it is not in the NGOs’ interest to unify the Kichwas but rather to create and 
control more manageable constituencies (Interviewee #29, January 18, 2012). As a result, the 
Kichwa organizations are caught between the regional indigenous offices and the NGOs as the 
two major forces that determine the Kichwas’ success to achieve their territorial rights. For the 
Kichwa leaders, having a good relationship with the indigenous offices and NGOs while 
maintaining their organizations is not easy. They are in constant struggle to find a way to get the 
most out of the NGOs and the government without losing the organization’s autonomy. 
The Bagua protest generated greater international interest to fund initiatives related to 
indigenous peoples. The international community has given funding to both new NGOs and the 
new indigenous government offices, but this has only exacerbated the problem of disunity. The 
NGO representatives themselves speak of how after the Bagua protest, their funders required 
focus more on projects with indigenous organizations. With the Bagua protest the Amazonian 
indigenous organizations became more popular, which resulted in NGOs that never before 
worked in indigenous issues to reach out to the Kichwas. As a result, Kichwa leaders have 
competed with each other for the relative windfall in NGO funding. Even with this funding, it 
has not been enough to overcome the financial and temporal costs of communication with remote 
villages. Thus, despite the new avenues of support from the government and NGOs, many 
communities remain marginalized.  
 
CHALLENGE #08: THE CREATION OF CONSERVATION AREAS 
 
Regardless of the creation of offices run by Kichwas, the regional and the national 
government are still leasing the Kichwas’ territories as Conservation Areas. Though the creation 
 63 
of these areas for conservation is applauded, the idea behind them is to prevent the Kichwas from 
having access to those territories. The director of the NGO Waman Wasi, expounded: 
The government has created Conservation Areas in those territories that the 
indigenous communities use for hunting and fishing. All these actions of the 
government are weakening the organizations even more. But the organizations are 
not going to stop claiming those territories. They will have to die once, twice, but 
they are going to continue fighting for those territories that have always belonged 
to them. (Interviewee #14, July 13, 2011) 
 
One major consequence of the government’s actions is that the San Martín region is running out 
of territory for the Kichwas. Under the excuse that the whole region has already been distributed 
in Conservation Areas to ensure a better management of the forest, all the Kichwas’ lands have 
already been leased out. Today, for Kichwas the main threat is the case of the Conservation Area 
“Cordillera Escalera.” 
To be able to protect their territory, Kichwas have to find a way to combat the 
government’s paternalist view regarding the care of the forest. The government commonly 
assumes that because the Kichwas are poor, they are a major threat to the environment. For the 
Kichwa leaders, the government must stop seeing them as their enemies. All the Kichwas agreed 
it would be better for the sake of all the inhabitants of the region if the government started to 
consider them as valid allies. The Kichwa leaders gave the management of Conservation Areas 
such as Cordillera Escalera as an example. With the creation of this Conservation Area the 
government is putting the Kichwas in jail for trespassing in that area. However, to the Kichwa 
leaders, the government has shown the inability to protect that area from being exploited by 
settlers because of the lack of economic resources and the knowledge needed to protect the 
territory. The statement of the ex-president of CEPKA reflects this concern: 
The regional government, under the pretext of preserving the land, the water, and 
the environment, has been creating these Conservation Areas without consulting 
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us, saying that the Kichwas will not take care of those territories. But that is our 
function. We know how to take care of the territory; we do not want to destroy it, 
but to preserve it. The Regional Government does not have a budget and the 
migrants continue to occupy that land. (Interviewee #16, July 10, 2011) 
 
The government’s policies to deny the Kichwas’ territorial rights have resulted in a greater 
rejection and distrust of the government’ initiatives to create offices run by Kichwas. Even the 
local newspapers have acknowledged in several articles the hypocrisy of the regional president’s 
practices towards the indigenous groups after his discourse won their support in the elections.40 
The regional government's leasing of Kichwa territories has triggered different responses 
from the Kichwa federations. One of the new federations, FEKHID, has started a process of 
claiming territory by just asking for a leasing permit. With that permit, the federation is allowed 
to manage the territory for a period of 40 years. Another federation, CEPKA, has been asking for 
joint management of the Conservation Area since that area overlaps with Kichwa territory. 
CEPKA wants an equal partnership with the government in the management of that area 
indefinitely. Overall, for the Kichwas the risk of losing access to the territories used for hunting 
and fishing since ancient times has caused conflicts among the federations because the leaders do 
not agree about what should be the most effective way to secure control over their territory.  
 The case of the Conservation Area Cordillera Escalera shows the government’s double 
discourse towards the Kichwas because it supports the existence of indigenous offices, but at the 
same time it prevents the Kichwas from having access to their territories. In 2005, the regional 
government created Cordillera Escalera knowing that part of that territory belonged to the 
Kichwas. Because the government’s illegal actions were carried out without consulting the 
affected indigenous populations, the Kichwa leaders sued the regional government. In 
accordance with national and international laws that protect indigenous ancestral lands, the 
                                                
40 La Voz, January 15 of 2012. 
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Kichwas had the right to be consulted if they wanted a Conservation Area in their territories. 
Recently, nine people from one of the sixteen Kichwa communities that overlap with the 
Cordillera Escalera were prosecuted for farming an acre of land in the Conservation Area 
(Interviewee #44, August 03, 2012). Meanwhile, the Kichwas believe the regional government is 
rejecting the participation of the Kichwa leaders in the Master Plan to facilitate the oil 
exploitation in Cordillera Escalera. As a result, for the first time the Kichwa federations are 
working together to demand participation in the elaboration of the Master Plan of Cordillera 
Escalera as the only way to ensure the official recognition of their territories. 
The possibilities of reaching an understanding between the federations and the 
government have already been put in doubt by the marginalization of the Kichwa leaders in the 
public meetings to elaborate the Master Plan 2012-2017 of Cordillera Escalera. I participated in 
the last public meeting arranged to collect opinions about Cordillera Escalera’s management 
from all the stakeholders in the region (Participant Observation #07, July 24, 2012). Although 
the Kichwa leaders from the four federations were not invited to this meeting, the Kichwa 
leaders claimed their right to be part of the management of Cordillera Escalera because those 
territories belong to them in the first place. Rather than address them as a united front, the 
regional government is trying to negotiate with each federation individually in a “divide and 
conquer” strategy.  
The regional government’s preference to incorporate the oil companies’ executives 
instead of Kichwa leaders in the updating process of the Master Plan reaffirms the Kichwas’ 
suspicions. The Kichwas know the government representatives have a previous commitment to 
the interests of the oil companies. The leasing contract acquired by Talisman Energy in 
partnership with Repsol YPF and Petrobras of the Lot 103 overlaps with Cordillera Escalera and 
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the Kichwa territory. In the interviews with Kichwa leaders, all of them expressed concern about 
the government’s refusal to invite the Kichwas’ to workshops held to discuss the elaboration of 
the Master Plan whereas oil company executives were. Therefore, the constant tension between 
the Kichwas and the government has intensified by the threat posed by the oil companies’ 
presence.  
 
CHALLENGE #09: ILLEGAL SETTLERS 
 
The regional government is not able to secure Kichwa territories from settlers exploiting 
natural resources. The Regional Government can afford to pay just a few park rangers, who, in 
contrast with the Kichwas, are unfamiliar with the territory. Consequently, the Kichwa leaders 
are the ones who end up notifying the authorities about the illegal presence of settlers. By the 
time the regional government acknowledges the settlers’ invasion, the settlers have already set up 
in the territory by felling trees and farming the land.  
According to NGO representatives and Kichwa leaders, local inhabitants cannot risk 
waiting for the regional authorities to take actions against these settlers. Therefore, the Kichwa 
leaders have to gather as many people as they can to protect their territories: “We knew we had 
to be careful with these people (migrantes) because last time we told them to obey the law of the 
community, they did not want to. So, we took them by surprise… To protect ourselves we were a 
group of 100 people” (Interviewee #40, July 31, 2012). The growing number of illegal settlers in 
Cordillera Escalera highlights that the regional government should not be the one controlling that 
area. For the Kichwas, the real interest of the government is to prevent the presence of the 
Kichwas, not the settlers.  
 67 
The illegal presence of the settlers threatens the Kichwas’ main activities of small-scale 
agriculture (chacras) and hunting. Kichwa knowledge about avoiding soil erosion has made it 
possible for them to survive on what they harvest and hunt since time immemorial. The majority 
of the products that they harvest are for their own consumption, and they usually sell the rest or 
trade it for other goods such as cleaning appliances, school appliances, and clothes. What 
remains of the Kichwas’ territories is under threat because of the settlers. Illegal settlers aim to 
profit as much as they can from the natural resources. They are not planning to stay in the area 
for a long time. By felling trees and growing monoculture products such as coffee and cacao, 
which are highly valued in the market, they damage the land. Kichwa leaders, NGOs, and 
government representatives agreed the illegal settlers have been causing great harm to the 
territory, and yet no one can control it. As a result, the illegal settlers are becoming powerful 
figures inside some Kichwa territories because they have more economic resources than anybody 
else, as well as more political influence.  
 
CHALLENGE #10: OVERLAPPING AUTHORITIES 
 
The overlapping number of authority figures in the Kichwa communities weakens the 
communities and their federations. Due to the Law of Native Communities, each of the Kichwa 
communities should have a single leadership system, which means the community is led by one 
leader called apu, and five men who help him with his duty in the community. However, in some 
situations native communities have been officially recognized after the formation of villages. 
These villages have another system of leadership. Local mestizo government positions such as 
Mayor (the head of the City Hall) and Governor (the local representative of the president of the 
national government) clash with the villages’ traditional leadership systems based on apus. 
 68 
Thanks to these overlapping systems of leadership, it is easier for the illegal settlers to 
stay there and encroach upon some of the territories for timber and large-scale monocrops. Once 
these settlers find the way to stay in these territories with their families, they participate in the 
elections of local authorities in exchange of more participation in the Mayor’s and Governor’s 
offices, allowing them to circumventing traditional Kichwa organization. 
First a few people invade Kichwa territories that are so distant that is hard even 
for Kichwas to realize their invasion.  Then, over the years these settlers begin to 
support the presence of mestizos in local political offices. Finally, the authorities 
and government offices are full of mestizos, many of whom are migrants or come 
from a migrant family. That is how Kichwas are becoming more marginalized in 
their own territories. (Interviewee #32, July 18, 2012) 
 
The overlapping of authorities inside Kichwa territories is intensifying the extraction of natural 
resources. Despite the fact that these lands belong to the Kichwas, the settlers' improving 
political position makes it more difficult for Kichwas to claim their rights to these territories. In 
some cases, like in the Kichwa native community “Waicu,” the population is divided between 
those who support the local government authorities such as the Mayor and the Governor, and the 
ones who support native community’s authorities (Participant Observation, August 05, 2012). 
This division makes it extremely difficult for Kichwa leaders to strengthen and legitimize their 
authority and their organization.  
 
CHALLENGE #11: NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
The national political parties’ using Kichwa leaders for election purposes cause great 
damage to Kichwa organizations. In election times, the national political parties employ the 
Kichwa leaders as an easy way to have a greater influence in these areas. Generally, the political 
party will call a Kichwa leader from one federation, and the opponent political party would call 
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the Kichwa leader from another federation. Therefore, every three years the Kichwa leaders are 
competing with each other for reasons that do not really concern them. As the leaders say, they 
have to be careful not to get “burned” during electoral campaigns. Most of the time, being 
involved in these political struggles damage their reputation as leaders among their peers and 
constituencies. Thus, the advantage taken by the political parties delegitimize the Kichwa 
leaders’ role, which in turn makes the Kichwas believe they cannot trust their leaders, putting in 
jeopardy the future of the organization.  
 
CHALLENGE #12: NATIONAL INDIGENOUS POLITICS 
 
The lack of coordination between the Kichwa federations and the national Amazonian 
federation (AIDESEP),41 directed by Alberto Pizango, who led the protest in Bagua, has resulted 
in little support for the Kichwas’ struggle outside the San Martín region. Although the Bagua 
protest brought together the majority of the Amazonian indigenous organizations from Peru, 
including the ones represented by AIDESEP, the participation of the Kichwas in this protest did 
not result in the creation of a network of indigenous organizations to rely on. The director of the 
NGO Urku describes this disconnect: “There is no dialogue with other ethnic groups in the 
region. Although there is an office responsible for that... If they get to coordinate at all, it is only 
about superfluous issues. There is no integration between them. Everyone seeks for their own 
interests” (Interviewee #05, June 09, 2011). Thus, without that network, and therefore without an 
organization that is able to represent the Kichwas at the national level, the national government 
continues to ignore the Kichwas’ situation. 
                                                
41 AIDESEP (Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest). 
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The Kichwa federations do not see the benefits of being affiliated to AIDESEP. Just one 
of the Kichwa federations is officially linked to AIDESEP, and that affiliation has not meant an 
improvement for the federation. According to the leaders of FEPIKRESAM, the relationship 
between their federation and AIDESEP resembles the one between a mother and a child. 
FEPIKRESAM respects AIDESEP, but the Kichwa leaders do realize that the relationship causes 
them to lose their autonomy. Whenever FEPIKRESAM has had a funding opportunity, they first 
needed the approval of AIDESEP. Then, because of the lack of resources, FEPIKRESAM has 
not maintained a closer relationship with AIDESEP. As a result, the Kichwas have limited 
options to work together. As much as they want to, each federation follows different guidelines 
that isolate them from each other and prevents them from having a stronger voice. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, I have examined the challenges Kichwa federations face as they work for 
the recognition of their territories. For the Kichwas of San Martín, gaining their land rights over 
a territory that has traditionally been theirs is their main motivation. To achieve that recognition, 
in the last ten years Kichwas have started a process of organization. Today Kichwa leaders are 
aware that to counter the government’s leasing process of the Amazon, they need to claim the 
formal recognition of their territories. To that end, the Kichwas have started to get their legal 
status as native communities, and in turn, such communities have formed federations. Native 
communities rely on their federations for their political representation at the local and national 
level. In the San Martin region there are four Kichwa federations, which try to recruit as many 
Kichwa communities as possible. The more legally recognized Kichwa communities there are in 
the region, the more the government officials will feel compelled to include the Kichwas in their 
political agendas. However, this process of organization has been hindered by several obstacles. 
To understand this process of organization and the obstacles that come with it was not an 
easy task. Fortunately, due to international attention after the Bagua protest, and the national 
attention because Humala’s presidential campaign, Kichwa leaders were more willing than usual 
in 2011 to share their experiences of organization. The Kichwas considered my academic 
research as “favorable” to their cause. As I explained in chapter one, it surprised me how every 
time I went back to San Martin, the dynamics of Kichwa political representation had changed. In 
a time period of one year two new federations were created, and the number of Kichwa 
settlements that were waiting to achieve their status as native communities was increasing, too. 
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Conducting interviews with Kichwa leaders, NGO staff, and government representatives allowed 
me to understand that the political organization of Kichwas is constantly changing. This fast 
evolving process has resulted in new risks for Kichwa leaders such as the proliferation of 
competing leadership positions. 
In chapter two I explored theoretical debates about the political representation of 
indigenous groups in the Amazon. Amazonians’ aim to protect their land in a neoliberal context 
has driven them to employ different strategies. According to the literature, although neoliberal 
policies in Latin America have meant greater recognition of indigenous’ peoples in the state’s 
agenda, this recognition has not implied indigenous’ rights to their territory. This holds true for 
the Kichwas, and as a result, Amazonians groups are being forced to found different ways to 
create political platforms that would allow them to continue with their struggles. 
According to the literature, NGOs have played a key role supporting indigenous’ claims 
for land rights, providing funding and alliances to support indigenous causes under the 
assumption that indigenous peoples are more capable to protect the environment. This literature 
provided me a framework to understand Kichwas’ efforts to gain their land titles through the 
creation or strengthening of their political organizations. However the relationship between 
environmental NGOs and Amazonian groups implies several risks. As I have argued, too much 
involvement of NGOs raises the expectations about the needed resources generating political 
divisions among different leaders as well as generating the creation of new federations.     
Additionally, the reviewed literature assumes that NGOs and indigenous organizations 
focus their activities exclusively in environmental affairs. As I have argued, this assumption does 
not necessarily match with the agendas of organizations of this area. For domestic NGOs 
working in San Martín Region, as well as for the Kichwa federations, environmental claims are 
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inseparable of political, territorial, and cultural claims. Future research should take into 
consideration that the four federations studied in this thesis are addressing a heterogeneous list of 
grievances related with citizenship recognition, agricultural assistance, cultural preservation, and 
environmental conservation.  
Chapter three provides a short overview of Peruvian history as way to understand the 
state’s complex relationship with the Amazon. With the exception of the General Juan Velasco’s 
government, and the three first months of government of the current president Ollanta Humala, 
enacted laws toward the Amazon have favored land ownership by private entities and settlers. 
Alan García’s second government disregarded Amazonian indigenous’ property rights almost 
completely until the Bagua protest brought the situation to national attention.  
The Bagua protest, coupled with the government’s two-faced policies of giving away 
Amazonian territory to outsiders while creating indigenous offices, has transformed the political 
dynamics of indigenous organizations. The protest, followed by the expectations raised by the 
candidate Ollanta Humala, who seemed to be the candidate of the poor, has given the Kichwas 
the needed political boost to continue with their claims for land rights recognition. 
In chapter four I discuss the challenges that Kichwa organizations have to overcome to 
gain their territorial rights, for example their relationships with NGOs, and the creation of areas 
of natural conservation by the regional government.  
Kichwa leaders in various positions have played a decisive role in organizing Kichwas in 
native communities. However, community organization is not enough. They unite to form 
federations, and this requires new extra-communal leadership and funding, which today largely 
comes from NGOs. The challenge for emerging local leaders is to make sure that, despite their 
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necessary relationship with NGOs and their involvement in government offices, their agendas 
should not conflict with the federation’s plans.  
Kichwas have to deal with the government’s support of land invasions while expelling 
the Kichwas from their ancestral territories via the creation of “natural reserves” like the 
Cordillera Escalera project. Indigenous groups can combine “formal” strategies, like the 
involvement in governmental offices in charge of indigenous affairs, and “informal” strategies 
like road blockages and marches of protest. For the last five years, the regional government of 
San Martín has created conservation areas, such as the Cordillera Escalera, while leasing 
territory to private companies without the consent of the Kichwa people. In the case of Cordillera 
Escalera project, Kichwas united to eject the settlers. Today many Kichwas are in jail for 
entering into this area, or are enduring long legal trials for protesting against this project. 
In sum, the twelve challenges that Kichwa organizations have to overcome to gain their 
territorial rights, detailed in chapter four, are following:  
(1) Gaining the status of native community. In order to gain the status of native 
community, these organizations have to go through a complex and arduous paperwork process 
under the supervision of government officials unsympathetic to indigenous identity or interests. 
The exhaustive process effectively discourages many Kichwas. 
(2) The federations’ role. There is no consensus among Kichwa leaders about who 
should be part of their constituency. Older federations restrict their membership to officially 
recognized native communities, whereas newer federations seek to include all Kichwa peoples, 
whether they are in officially recognized communities or not.  
(3) Communication between the federations & communities. Federations lack 
adequate channels of communication. Because the territory is so vast, and the economic 
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resources are limited, the communication between federations’ leaders and their constituencies is 
not fluid. This lack of communication affects the unity of the federations. 
(4) Creation of new federations. The multiplication of federations can result in political 
and economic competition rather than unification for the overarching goal: the legal recognition 
of their territories. The creation of new federations represents an increase in the number of 
Kichwa leaders, which means higher levels of organizational complexity. 
(5) New leaders versus old leaders. There are different models of leadership inside the 
federations. Older leaders are traditionally respected by local inhabitants, and closer to Kichwas 
devoted to traditional subsistence agriculture. Young leaders attract the young segment of the 
populations thanks to their higher levels of formal education. Rather than making their strengths 
complementary, these leaders and their constituencies often compete.  
(6) The influence of NGOs. The alliance between federations and NGOs implies risks. 
The misconception that federations receive an important flow of resources from NGOs usually 
generates misunderstandings between the leaders and their constituencies. Political 
fragmentation is one possible outcome of this kind of misunderstanding. New federations are 
created aiming for new political opportunities and external sources of funding.  
(7) Representation in the regional government. Leaders working in government offices 
for indigenous affairs are caught in between the government’s interests and the agendas of the 
Kichwa organizations. On one hand, the government’s lack of support to these offices show that 
it does not genuinely want to promote indigenous rights. On the other hand, some Kichwas 
hoped that having Kichwa representatives working from inside the government could improve 
their position in their quest for land rights. 
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(8) The creation of conservation areas. According to state representatives, there is not 
enough untitled land to grant native communities their ancestral territories. Nevertheless, the 
state officials are leasing out large tracks to private companies, allowing the arrival of new 
settlers from the Andes, and creating Conservation Areas. The case of the Conservation Area 
known as “Cordillera Escalera” illustrates the government’s unwillingness to protect the 
ancestral territories of the Kichwas. 
(9) Illegal settlers. The increasing presence of settlers in Kichwa territories threatens 
their autonomy as native community. Illegal settlers have been extracting natural resources and 
damaging the environment. 
(10) Overlapping authorities. There is an overlap between Kichwa leaders and non-
Kichwa authorities (municipal mayors and governors) that is weakening the federations. These 
Kichwa authorities are constantly struggling for legitimation and recognition. Local mestizo 
government positions clash with the villages’ traditional leadership systems based on apus. 
(11) National political parties. In electoral seasons, national political parties seek 
Kichwa votes by involving local leaders in their political machineries. These political battles, 
which are more economic from the Kichwas’ perspective because they involve bribes, generate a 
competition between Kichwa leaders, increasing political fragmentation. 
(12) National indigenous politics. The connection of Kichwa federations with the most 
important national Amazonian federation, AIDESEP, has not yet translated into a stronger 
presence of the Kichwas from San Martin in the national political realm.  
In summary, in this thesis I have explained these twelve challenges that the Kichwas have 
overcome in order to gain their territorial rights. As I have argued, these challenges prevent the 
Kichwas from becoming politically strong. By not having a united political platform, the 
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Kichwas are disadvantaged and thus have not been able to obtain their land rights. I conclude 
that a larger number of federations result in the fragmentation of the Kichwas, and thus in less 
chance of achieving a unified political representation. It may be, however, that the formation of 
federations is the first step in pan-Kichwa organization. That remains to be seen in future 
research. 
 
 
 78 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Almeida Vinueza, José. “The Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement and the Gutiérrez Regime: The 
Traps of Multiculturalism.”PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 28, no. 1 
(2005): 93-111. 
 
Arambiza, Evelio; Painter, Michael. “Biodiversity Conservation and the Quality of Life of 
Indigenous People in the Bolivian Chaco.” Human Organization 65 (1) (2006): 20–34. 
 
Barclay, Federica. “Cambios y Continuidades en el Pacto Colonial en la Amazonia. El Caso de 
los Indios Chasutas del Huallaga Medio a Finales del Siglo XIX.” Bulletin de l'Institut 
Francais d'Études Andines (IFEA), 30(2) (2001): 187-210. 
 
Bebbington, Anthony. “The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the 
Andes.”NACLA Report on the Americas 42, no. 5 (2009): 12-20. 
 
Brysk, Alison. “Turning Weakness into Strength: The Internationalization of Indian 
Rights.”Latin American Perspectives 23, no. 2 (1996): 38-57. 
 
Calderón, Luis. “Relaciones interétnicas entre mestizos y nativos kechwa en Lamas en el 
contexto de la globalizacón.” Comunidades Locales Y Transnacionales: Cinco Estudios 
De Caso En El Perú.Lima: Instituto de Estudios peruanos(2003): 13-108. 
 
Cepek, Michael L. “Essential Commitments: Identity and the Politics of Cofán 
Conservation.”Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 13, no. 1 (2008): 
196-222. 
 
Conklin, Beth A, and Laura R Graham. “The Shifting Middle Ground: Amazonian Indians and 
Eco‐Politics.”American anthropologist 97, no. 4 (1995): 695-710. 
 
Conklin, Beth A. “Environmentalism, Global Community, and the New Indigenism.”Inclusion 
and exclusion in the global arena (2006): 161. 
 
Crabtree, John. Alan García en el poder: Perú, 1985-1990. Lima: Ediciones PEISA, 2005. 
 
Escobar, Arturo. “Whose Knowledge, Whose Nature? Biodiversity, Conservation, and the 
Political Ecology of Social Movements.”Journal of political ecology 5, no. 1 (1998): 53-
82. 
 
Finer, Matt, and Martí Orta-Martínez. “A Second Hydrocarbon Boom Threatens the Peruvian 
Amazon: Trends, Projections, and Policy Implications.”Environmental research letters 5, 
no. 1 (2010): 014012. 
 
 79 
Ghosh, Kaushik. “Between Global Flows and Local Dams: Indigenousness, Locality, and the 
Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India.”Cultural Anthropology 21, no. 4 (2006): 501-
34. 
 
González, Luisa Abad. Resistencia India Organizada: El Caso De Perú.Quito: Editorial Abya 
Yala, 2006. 
 
Graham, Laura R. “Image and Instrumentality in a Xavante Politics of Existential Recognition: 
The Public Outreach Work of Etenhiritipa Pimentel Barbosa.”American ethnologist 32, 
no. 4 (2005): 622-41. 
 
Green, Shane. Customizing Indigeneity.  California: Stanford University Press, 2009. 
 
———. “Getting over the Andes: The Geo-Eco-Politics of Indigenous Movements in Peru's 
Twenty-First Century Inca Empire.”Journal of Latin American Studies 38, no. 02 (2006): 
327-27. 
 
———. “Making Old Histories New in the Peruvian Amazon.”Anthropology Now 1, no. 3 
(2009): 52-60. 
 
Hale, Charles R. “Neoliberal Multiculturalism.”PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology 
Review 28, no. 1 (2005): 10-28. 
 
Hall, Derek, Philip Hirsch, and Tania Murray Li. Powers of exclusion: land dilemmas in 
Southeast Asia: NUS Press Singapore, 2011. 
 
Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Hristov, Jasmin. “Indigenous Struggles for Land and Culture in Cauca, Colombia.”Journal of 
Peasant Studies 32, no. 1 (2005): 88-117. 
 
Hughes, Neil. “Indigenous Protest in Peru: The ‘Orchard Dog’bites Back.”Social Movement 
Studies 9, no. 1(2010): 85-90. 
 
Keck, Margaret E. “Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the Rubber 
Tappers of Acre.”Comparative Politics (1995): 409-24. 
 
Killick, Evan. “Creating Community: Land Titling, Education, and Settlement Formation among 
the Ashéninka of Peruvian Amazonia.”The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean 
Anthropology 13, no. 1 (2008): 22-47. 
 
Lauer, Matthew. “Friends or Foes? Conflicts between Indigenous Politicians and 
Conservationists in the Upper Orinoco-Casiquiare Biosphere Reserve.” Cultural Survival 
Quarterly (2005): 48-52. 
 
 80 
Lucero, José Antonio. “Representing "Real Indians": The Challenges of Indigenous Authenticity 
and Strategic Constructivism in Ecuador and Bolivia.”Latin American Research Review 
41, no. 2 (2006): 31-56. 
 
Macdonald, Theodore. “Amazonian Indigenous views on the State: A place for corporate social 
responsibility?” Suffolk Transnat'l33 (2010): 439-461. 
 
Martinez-Alier, J. “Political Ecology, Distributional Conflicts, and Economic 
Incommensurability.”Sustainability: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences 2 (2005): 
395. 
 
McMichael, Philip. Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective. Los Angeles: Pine 
Forge Press, 2008. 
 
McMichael, Philip. Development for What and for Whom? In Philip McMichael (Ed.), 
Contesting Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change (pp. 15-16). New York: 
Routledge, 2010. 
 
Meléndez, Carlos, and Carlos León. “Perú 2009: Los Legados Del Autoritarismo.”Revista de 
Ciencia Política 30, no. 2 (2010): 451-77. 
 
Monge, Carlos. Humala y las industrias extractivas: Poca transformación y mucha continuidad. 
In Eduardo Toche (Ed.), Perú Hoy, La gran continuidad (pp. 375-395). Lima: DESCO, 
2012. 
 
Peña, Devon G. Chicano Culture, Ecology, Politics: Subversive Kin. Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1998. 
 
Pieck, Sonja K. “Opportunities for Transnational Indigenous Eco‐Politics: The Changing 
Landscape in the New Millennium.”Global Networks 6, no. 3 (2006): 309-29. 
 
Reed, Jean-Pierre. “Indigenous Land Policies, Culture and Resistance in Latin America.”Journal 
of Peasant Studies 31, no. 1 (2003): 137-56. 
 
Reed, Richard. “Two Rights Make a Wrong: Indigenous Peoples Versus Environmental 
Protection Agencies.”Applying Cultural Anthropology: An Introductory Reader (2003): 
108-115. 
 
Rénique, Gerardo. “Law of the Jungle in Peru: Indigenous Amazonian Uprising against 
Neoliberalism.”Socialism and Democracy 23, no. 3 (2009): 117-35. 
 
Roldán, Roque, and Ana María Tamayo. Legislación Y Derechos Indígenas En El Perú. Lima: 
CAAAP-Coama-Consolidacion de La Region Amazonica, 1999. 
 
Rootes, Christopher. “Acting Locally: The Character, Contexts and Significance of Local 
Environmental Mobilisations.”Environmental Politics 16, no. 5 (2007): 722-41. 
 81 
 
Santos-Granero, Fernando. “Boundaries Are Made to Be Crossed: The Magic and Politics of the 
Long-Lasting Amazon/Andes Divide.”Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 9, 
no. 4 (2002): 545-69. 
 
Sawyer, Suzana. Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in 
Ecuador. Durham and London: Duke University Press Books, 2004. 
 
Smith, Richard Chase. “The dialectics of domination in Peru: native communities and the myth 
of the vast Amazonian emptiness: an analysis of development planning in the Pichis 
Palcazu special project.” Cultural Survival 8, (1982). 
 
Speed, Shannon. “Dangerous Discourses : Human Rights and Multiculturalism in Neoliberal 
Mexico.” 28, no. 1 (2005): 29-51. 
 
Tsutsui, Kiyoteru. “Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary 
World.” Paper presented at the Sociological Forum, (2004). 
 
Vadjunec, Jacqueline M, Marianne Schmink, and Alyson L Greiner. “New Amazonian 
Geographies: Emerging Identities and Landscapes.”Journal of Cultural Geography 28, 
no. 1 (2011): 1-20. 
 
Varese, Stefano. “The Ethnopolitics of Indian Resistance in Latin America.”Latin American 
Perspectives 23, no. 2 (1996): 58-71. 
 
 
 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 83 
 
ANNEX #1: Geographical organization of San Martín 
 
Region Provinces Districts 
San Martin 
Lamas 
LAMAS 
ALONSO DE ALVARA (Roque) 
BARRANQUITA 
CAYNARACHI (Shanusi) 
CUÑUMBUQUI 
PINTO RECODO 
RUMISAPA 
SAN ROQUE DE CUMBAZA 
SHANAO 
TABALOSOS 
ZAPATERO 
San Martin 
TARAPOTO 
ALBERTO LEVEAU (Utcurarca) 
CACATACHI 
CHAZUTA 
CHIPURANA (Navarro) 
EL PORVENIR (Pelejo) 
HUMBAYOC 
JUAN GUERRA 
LA BANDA DE SHILCAYO (La Banda) 
MORALES 
PAPAPLAYA 
SAN ANTONIO 
SAUCE 
SHAPAJA 
El Dorado 
SAN JOSE DE SISA 
AGUA BLANCA 
SAN MARTIN 
SANTA ROSA 
SHATOJA 
Huallaga 
SAPOSOA 
ALTO SAPOSOA (Pasarraya) 
EL ESLABON 
PISCOYACU 
SACANCHE 
TINGO DE SAPOA 
Tocache TOCACHE 
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NUEVO PROGRESO 
POLVORA  
SHUNTE (Tambo de Paja) 
UCHIZA 
Rioja 
RIOJA 
AWAJUN (Bajo Naranjillo) 
ELIAS SOPLIN VARGAS (Sda. Jerusalén-
Azunguillo) 
NUEVA CAJAMARCA 
PARDO MIGUEL (Naranjos) 
POSIC 
SAN FERNANDO 
YORONGOS 
YURACYACU 
Picota 
PICOTA 
BUENOS AIRES 
CASPISAPA 
PILLUANA 
PUCACACA 
SAN CRISTOBAL (Puerto Rico) 
SAN HILARION (San Cristobal de Sisa) 
SHAMBOYACU 
TINGO DE PONASA 
TRES UNIDOS 
Moyobamba 
MOYOBAMBA 
CALZADDA 
HABANA 
JEPELACIO 
SORITOR 
YANTALO 
Mariscal Caceres 
JUANJUI 
CAMPANILLA 
HUICUNGO 
PACHIZA 
PAJARILLO 
Bellavista 
BELLAVISTA 
ALTO BIAVO (Cuzco) 
BAJO BIAVO (Nueva Lima) 
HUALLAGA (Ledoy) 
SAN PABLO 
SAN RAFAEL 
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ANNEX #2: Kichwa organizations of San Martín 
 
NGOs Federations Comunidades Nativas Kichwas Province 
CAAAP FEPIKRESAM 
Chiriyaku 
Lamas 
Pampa Sacha 
Yurilamas 
Chumbakiwi 
Kachipampa 
Alto Shambuyaku 
Vista Alegre de Sharariyak 
Waman Wasi &             
Sacha Mama CEPKA  
Pintu Yaku de Machu Picchu 
El Dorado 
Urmana Yaku 
Simbakiwi Yaku 
Pawana Anak 
Ampi Sacha de Mishki Yaku 
Kawana Ampi Urku 
Santa Marta 
Yaku Kawana de San Juan 
Tangarana 
Heladio Tapullima 
Puka Kaka 
Por Venir 
Puka Rumi 
San Ignacio 
Maray 
Chambira Picota 
Nuevo Lamas San Martin 
El Piñal 
Lamas 
Irapay Sacha 
El Naranjal 
Ampi Sacha de Santa Rosa 
Shapahilla 
Ankas Urku San Hilarion 
Nangao 
Churasapa 
Mishki Yakillu 
Solo del Rio Mayo 
Alto Pucalpillo 
Konkopera 
Wayku 
Shambuloa 
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Anak Juanjuysillu 
Alto Churu Yaku Molosh 
Shakapa 
Panjuy 
Urku FEKHID  
Aviacion 
El Dorado 
San Isidro 
Shucshu Yaku 
Chunchiwi 
Kawana Sisa 
? FEPIKECHA  Tuluntulumba Huallaga 
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ANNEX #3: Political Fragmentation 
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ANNEX #4: List of Interviews and participant observation 
Interviews  
  Interviews Position  Organization Date  
Place of 
interview  
1 Interviewee  #01 Vice-president   6/13/11 Tarapoto 
2 Interviewee  #02 APU    11/6/11 Yurilamas 
3 Interviewee  #03 APU   7/13/2011 Lamas 
4 Interviewee  #04 APU   5/7/11 Tarapoto 
5 Interviewee  #05 Director NGO Urku 9/6/11 Tarapoto 
6 Interviewee  #06 Director NGO CAAAP 6/7/11 Tarapoto 
7 Interviewee  #07 President Mujeres organizadas 9/7/11 Kawana Sisa 
8 
Interviewee  #08 President 
FEKHID 11/7/11 Tarapoto Interviewee  #09 APU 
Interviewee  #10 APU 
9 Interviewee  #11 Director Sacha Mama 7/13/11 Lamas 
10 Interviewee  #12 Asesor CEPKA 12/7/11 Tarapoto 
11 Interviewee  #13   UNSM 9/6/11 Tarapoto 
12 Interviewee  #14 President FEPIKRESAM 6/13/11 Tarapoto 
13 Interviewee  #15 Mayor   9/7/11 Kawana Sisa 
14 Interviewee  #16 Coordinator NGO Waman Wasi 7/13/11 Lamas 
15 Interviewee  #17 APU   8/7/11 Lamas 
16 Interviewee  #18 President CEPKA 10/7/11 Lamas 
17 Interviewee  #19 Profesora    9/7/11 Kawana Sisa 
18 Interviewee  #20 APU   7/14/11 Tuluntulumba 
19 Interviewee  #21 Promotor NGO CAAAP 10/6/11 Tarapoto 
20 Interviewee  #22 Vice presidente    7/14/11 Chazuta 
21 Interviewee  #23 Treasurer   11/6/11 Yurilamas 
22 Interviewee  #24 Coordinador NGO CAAAP 10/6/11 Tarapoto 
23 Interviewee  #25 Vice President FEPIKRESAM 8/7/11 Lamas 
24 Interviewee  #26 Coordinator Sangapilla 7/13/11 Lamas 
25 Interviewee  #27 President ORDEPISAM 1/14/12 Tarapoto 
26 Interviewee  #28 Governor Governorship of San Jose de Sisa 1/14/12 Tarapoto 
27 Interviewee  #29 APU   12/1/12 Lamas 
28 Interviewee  #30 Leutenant Governor Governorship of San Jose de Sisa 11/1/12 Tarapoto 
29 Interviewee  #31 Alderman of Lamas Municipality of Lamas 1/18/12 Lamas 
30 Interviewee  #32 
Chair of the Office of 
Indigenous Affair 
Office of Indigenous Affair in Lamas 1/18/12 Lamas 
# 
Interviewee  #33 Gerente Técnico  
NGO Conservacion Internacional (CI) 4/6/12 Lima 
Interviewee  #34 Coordinador de 
Servicios Ecosistémicos 
Interviewee  #35 Coordinadora de Políticas Ambientales 
32 Interviewee  #36 Legal Advisor  FERIAAM 7/18/12 Moyobamba 
33 Interviewee  #37 President ORDEPISAM 7/20/12 Moyobamba 
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34 Interviewee  #38 Director 
ONG Instituto para el desarrollo de la 
Paz Amazonica (IDPA) 7/23/12 Tarapoto 
35 Interviewee  #39 Legal Advisor  FEPIKECHA 7/26/12 Tarapoto 
36 Interviewee  #40 President FEPIKECHA 7/29/12 Chazuta 
37 Interviewee  #41 Vice-president FEPIKRESAM 7/30/12 Lamas 
38 Interviewee  #42 
Director Proyecto 
Zonificacion Ecologica 
Economica  
Municipality of Lamas 7/30/12 Lamas 
39 Interviewee  #43 Director ONG Paz y Esperanza 7/31/12 Moyobamba 
40 Interviewee  #44 Director Urku 7/31/12 Tarapoto 
41 Interviewee  #45 Consultant NGO Conservacion Internacional (CI) 1/8/12 Moyobamba 
42 Interviewee  #46 Director Agencia Regional de Lamas 2/8/12 Lamas 
43 Interviewee  #47 President FEPIKRESAM 3/8/12 Lamas 
44 Interviewee  #48 Legal Advisor  FEPIKRESAM 3/8/12 Lamas 
45 Interviewee  #49 Director ONG Waman Wasi 7/8/12 Lamas 
46 Interviewee  #50 President CEPKA 7/8/12 Lamas 
Participant Observation 
1 Participant Observation #01 Kawana Sisa 7/9/11 Kawana Sisa 
2 Participant Observation #02   FEPIKRESAM 6/13/11 Tarapoto 
3 Participant Observation #03 Yurilamas FEPIKRESAM Y CAAAP 6/11/11 Yurilamas 
4 Participant Observation #04   1/16/12 
San Jose de 
Sisa 
5 Participant Observation #05   FEPIKECHA 7/21/12 Chazuta 
6 Participant Observation #06   
FEPIKRESAM, FEKHID, CEPKA, 
FEPIKECHA 7/23/12 Tarapoto 
7 Participant Observation #07   
FEPIKRESAM, FEKHID, CEPKA, 
FEPIKECHA 7/24/12 Tarapoto 
8 Participant Observation #08 Chiriksacha FEKHID 7/25/12 
San Jose de 
Sisa 
9 Participant Observation #09   FEPIKECHA 7/29/12 Chazuta 
10 Participant Observation #10 Waicu FEPIKRESAM, CEPKA 8/3/12 Lamas 
11 Participant Observation #11 Waicu FEPIKRESAM 8/5/12 Lamas 
12 Participant Observation #12 Chirikyacu CEPKA 8/7/12 Lamas 
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ANNEX #5: Chart of the different Kichwa federations in San Martín 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FEPIKRESAM 
 
-First Kichwa federation from 
Lamas in San Martin. 
-Founded in 1992. 
-It has 7 native communities 
with communal territory 
recognized by law. 
-Has support from the NGO 
CAAAP. 
CEPKA 
 
-Second Kichwa federation from Lamas, 
but it also includes Comunidades Nativas 
from El Dorado, Picota, and San Martin. 
-Founded in 2002 by some of the leaders 
from FEPIKRESAM. 
-It has 39 native communities, none of 
them has obtained the formal recognition 
of their communal territory. 
-Has support from the NGOs 
WamanWasi and Sacha Mama. 
FEKHID 
 
-First Kichwa 
federation from El 
Dorado. 
-Founded in 2010. 
-It includes 
former native 
communities from 
FEPIKRESAM & 
CEPKA, new 
native 
communities and 
Kichwa grassroots 
organizations. 
-Has support from 
the NGO Urku. 
FEPIKECHA 
 
-First Kichwa 
federation from 
Huallaga. 
-Founded in 
January 2012. 
-It seems it has 
one native 
community 
from CEPKA 
and another one 
from 
FEPIKRESAM. 
